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1. Introduction 
The severe auditing and accounting debacles in the beginning of this century induced 
calls for regulatory improvement in many industries. The Enron default in December 
2001 is the most discussed and publicized scandal, and induced to challenge the 
competence and value of credit ratings. Credit rating agencies (CRAs), in their role 
as “financial journalists”, publish opinions about the creditworthiness of debt issues 
and issuers. In other words, ratings give information about the likeliness of a timely 
repayment and the probability of default of the issuer. In the case of Enron, the three 
principal CRAs (Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s [S&P] and Fitch) rated this company 
“investment grade” until four days before it declared bankruptcy. An investment grade 
rating is an indicator for a “secure” investment which is suitable to be held by a 
conservative investor. Obviously, Enron’s debt was four days before it defaulted not 
an advisable investment opportunity, actually it was “junk”.  
 
Regulators around the world started to use CRAs as a tool in their 
“safety-and-soundness” regulation. The regulation of financial institutions had its 
onset after the Wall Street crash in 1929 (Black Thursday) and the following Great 
Depression. The aim is to protect the lenders from losses that would arise when huge 
financial institutions default and it should also retain stability in the bank framework. 
In the U.S. prohibits the regulatory regime many important institutions to hold 
financial instruments not rated “investment grade”. These regulated institutional 
investors account for a majority of  the overall investment volume. Such a favorable 
investment grade rating can only be certificated by a Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO). The SEC approves the CRAs qualifying for 
that external regulation function. Until 2003 were entitled solely the principal three 
CRAs, Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, for issuing such a favorable rating. The credit rating 
industry is dominated by Moody’s and S&P, having a combined market share of 
about 80% – together with Fitch amounts their share approximately 95%. 
 - 2 - 
                                           
“There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There’s the 
United States and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service. The United 
States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody’s can destroy you 
by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it's not clear sometimes 
who's more powerful.”1
Although Enron with its extraordinary character, driven by fraud and chicanery of the 
management, caused a lot of attention, the aim for improvement should not be to 
prevent another Enron. But, the evoked attention can be used to concentrate on the 
several problems and conflicts in the industry, resulting from the main problem: the 
high market concentration. In a more competitive industry the prices may be lower 
and the quality may be higher. Potential entrants and competitors are arguably the 
most hurt in the current situation due to several entry barriers. 
 
To find solutions for easing the current market domination by two CRAs, have to be 
investigated the following four issues: 
- Which tasks might fulfill the CRAs?  
Beside the “traditional” informational value of CRAs, piercing the fog of information 
asymmetries between them and the issuers, qualifies the product of some CRAs also 
for transactional and regulatory use.  
- Holds the domination for the complete industry or can be identified market sectors 
with a different picture? 
The traditional information gathering is dominated by Moody’s and S&P, and it seems 
that all parties – except new or small market players – are comfortable with the 
current situation. There is no competition between the market leaders because 
issuers pay both for being rated. In theory has a new entrant three possibilities to 
compete with the principal CRAs: to compete on price, to have lower standards (ease 
of dealing with issuers) or to specialize in a business niche.  
- What are the reasons for the market structure? 
Natural reasons like economies of scale, standardization in rating and mergers 
among the CRAs induced the current market structure. The development of the bond 
capital market explains the stronger demand for CRAs in the U.S. and why the 
regulatory use of few CRAs in the U.S. had that grave consequences on the whole 
 
1 Interview with Thomas L. Friedman [1996], “The MacNeil/Lehrer Newsour”. 
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industry. Especially the U.S. regulatory regime created a demand for ratings and 
limited the supply on a few CRAs (until 2003: Moody’s, S&P, Fitch). 
- Which conflicts and problems have to be considered when making proposals for 
improvement? 
There can be identified several conflicts of interest, wherein a CRA has an economic 
interest in issuing a rating based on anything else than on creditworthiness of the 
issuer. Those strengthen basically the market position and profitability of the principal 
CRAs. The increased relevance of the principal CRAs makes it difficult to get the 
“right” rating and to rebut that the market is solely that concentrated because the sold 
product is actually not needed but the regulators generated a demand and restricted 
supply. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the principal CRAs do more than solely 
selling favorable regulatory treatment and that they provide information. Accordingly 
should be considered how regulators could ease the current market concentration 
and make a workable system better.  
 
A less concentrated market would lower the prices and increases the quality. 
Regulators should expand the list of CRAs used for regulatory purposes by those 
CRAs that have proved for several years their informational valuable output. 
Additionally should be the criteria for CRAs for regulatory use less focused on input 
than on output and an ongoing oversight of the recognized CRAs has to be done by 
the regulators. The immediate cease of NRSRO-designation would strengthen the 
current market leaders due to the institutional context wherein the change would take 
place. Market-based measures like credit spreads are no appropriate alternative. 
 
 
 2. The Relevance of Credit Ratings2 
A credit rating is the opinion of a credit rating agency (CRA) about the 
creditworthiness of an entity and/or the debt obligation issued by it.3 Most agencies, 
at least the large ones, as Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, rank the issuers and instruments 
based on a relative probability of default. 4  The credit rating is measured on the 
long-run, therefore “through the cycle”, and is driven by the business risk and the 
financials of the entity.5 Credit ratings are discrete letter ratings and may have a 
commentary. The letter rating is the rating category which, generally distinguished, is 
“investment-grade” or “non-investment-grade”.  
S&P Moody's Meaning
AAA Aaa highest quality
AA+ Aa1
AA Aa2
AA- Aa3
A+ A1
A A2
A- A3
BBB+ Baa1
BBB Baa2
BBB- Baa3
BB+ Ba1
BB Ba2
BB- Ba3
B+ B1
B B2
B- B3
CCC+
CCC Caa
CCC-
C Ca
D
Moody's 
has no "D"-
rating
in
ve
st
m
en
t g
ra
dehigh quality
strong 
payment 
capacity
adequate 
payment 
capacity
likely to repay, 
ongoing 
uncertainty 
no
n-
in
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m
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t g
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de
"ju
nk
"
high risk 
obligation 
vulnerable
to default, or
in default
in bancrupcy 
or default
 
Table 1: Long-term debt rating scales 
                                            
2 My discussion of the ‘what are credit ratings’ owes essentially to Frost [2006], Hill [2004] and Partnoy 
[1999]; my discussion of the rating industry history owes essentially to Cantor & Paker [1994] and 
Sylla [2001]. 
3 For definitions of a CRA see, for instance, Cantor and Packer [1994], Frost [2006] and SEC [2005a]. 
4 Moody’s Investor Service (Moody’s), Standard & Poor’s Credit Market Services (S&P) and Fitch, Inc. 
(Fitch) have a combined market share of about 95%. (See Economist 06/2007). For convenience, I will 
refer to these three CRAs collectively as “principal or large CRAs”. 
5 See Amato and Forfine [2003] and Cantor and Mann [2003] for discussion on rating through the 
business cycle. See AMF [2005], BIS [2000] and SEC [2003a] for approaches and procedures used 
by CRAs. 
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AAA to BBB- are the four highest ratings and are termed “investment-grade”. BB+ 
and lower ratings are called “non-investment-grade”. Fitch uses the same scale as 
S&P. All further rating class specifications in this paper refer due to simplification to 
S&P’s scale. The descriptive meaning of the different classes has been taken over by 
Partnoy [1999].  Short-term debt has to be paid off at a date less than one year in the 
future and has a different rating scale. S&P [2005] stated that the credit rating’s 
commentary can include a “credit watch” and/or a “credit outlook” which give a 
prospect and further information about the underlying’s perspective. 
 
The principal CRAs build up their evaluation on quantitative models and a qualitative 
analysis done by analysts. Smaller CRAs base their assessments merely on a 
quantitative evaluation due to a staff limitation. Seven out of 30 agencies investigated 
in the Bank for International Settlements [BIS 2000] had twelve or fewer employees. 
 
At least, after the series of scandals the question occurred, how and why issuers are 
incentivized to buy a rating from a CRA (or even multiple ratings from different CRAs). 
The following parties in the industry rely on the value (product) marketed by CRAs: 
investors, issuers and regulators. First I describe these parties and how they use 
credit ratings. Afterwards, I distinguish three different roles of CRAs and differentiate 
by informational value, transactional and regulatory relevance of credit ratings.  
2.1. The Parties6 
Issuers benefit from purchasing credit ratings through various reasons. Their main 
intention is to improve the marketability and the pricing of the issue. A further reason 
may be the satisfaction of investors or counterparties who seek for more 
management responsibility. Not uncommon seek issuers for more than one rating 
from different CRAs. For instance, the customs in the U.S. long-term security market 
require issuers to at least a second rating to affirm the first one. A single-rated issue 
would be priced below an issue which is affirmed by another similar one. 
 
Buy-side firms are pension funds, mutual funds and insurance companies. They are 
among the largest investors in the U.S. securities market. Indeed, buy-side firms 
                                            
6 My discussion of the parties owes essentially to SEC [2003a]. 
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receive information from CRAs, but nevertheless, they make their own evaluation of 
credit risk. They use their own results for both risk management and trading purposes. 
Credit ratings are one of several parameters in the assessment process to determine 
credit risk and investment analysis. Buy-side analysts, reviewing and analyzing credit 
ratings, try to conclude from one rating to another one and try to predict further rating 
actions. Buy-side firms may use credit ratings in in-house investment rules (e.g. an 
investment policy requires a certain level of credit rating), or to guarantee the 
compliance with several regulatory requirements. 
 
Sell-side firms, like broker-dealers (selling securities to clients), also make their own 
analysis for both risk management and trading purposes. In most instances use 
sell-side firms credit ratings in a similar way as buy-side firms. A difference between 
them is that many broker-dealers assist clients (issuers) in selecting adequate CRAs 
and guide them through the rating process. Further they act as dealer in markets, in 
which credit ratings have a large standing and importance (e.g. the OTC-derivative 
market). Often, large broker-dealers issue for funding reasons debt and receive for it 
themselves credit ratings. 
 
Regulators around the world use credit ratings for financial regulatory purposes. 
Beyond doubt, the U.S. has a long history in financial regulation and makes use of 
CRAs as a tool in it, but by now, comparing the situation globally, the profoundly 
difference becomes always less visible. The increased use of credit ratings all over 
the world enhanced the importance of them for certain market participants (directly 
for banks, pension funds, money market funds, insurance companies, et al., and 
indirectly for issuers). The dependence of these participants on ratings bears on the 
reliance on credit ratings by the regulators in their “safety-and-soundness” regulation. 
During the 1930’s started the U.S. regulators using CRAs with the expected 
character of a market based indicator for the riskiness of issues. White [2006] sees 
this reliance on CRAs as a regulatory delegation to specific out-side parties. 
Obviously see regulators credit ratings still as a good and workable tool to prevent 
defaults of large institutional investors through restricting there portfolio mixes. 
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2.2. The Informational Value 
The informational value of CRAs is understood as the provision of information by 
CRAs, which helps to deal with the uncertainties concerning the creditworthiness of 
borrowers. In this situation of asymmetric information between lenders (investors) 
and borrowers (issuers) help CRAs the lender-side to distinct more creditworthy 
borrowers from shoddy borrowers, and help the borrower-side to disclose their better 
creditworthiness to potential lenders. The moral hazard problem of transferring such 
information directly by the borrower is reduced through using a third party (a CRA) for 
signaling. The moral hazard problem refers to the risk that the borrower gains an 
advantage by exaggerating his creditworthiness and the lender doesn’t receive 
accurate information from the borrower.7 The prediction of default is the core of the 
CRA-business and is the output, to which the capital market cares most. 
 
Frost [2006] stated that this valuation role is affected by two qualities: ratings 
timeliness and information usefulness. Information usefulness is understood as the 
rating accuracy and the additional information provided in form of commentary (any 
form of prospects like watches and/or outlooks). 
2.3. The Transactional Relevance  
2.3.1. Contingency clauses 
Large CRAs facilitate contracting due to the fact that discrete letter ratings are seen 
as efficient benchmarks for the creditworthiness quality. Ratings-based constraints 
are used in private contracting (like bond covenants and credit agreements) and are 
found in in-house investment rules of institutional investors.8  
 
A closer look on rating triggers: A rating trigger admits the lender a contractual right 
when the rating of the borrower falls below a certain category. Such a rating trigger 
constitutes a certain level of protection of credit risk and lowers monitoring costs for 
the lender, simplifies agreement negotiations and reduces transaction costs. 
 
7 See Partnoy [1999] and Paul Hsueh and Kidwell [1988] for more information about the asymmetric 
information between investors and issuers and the moral hazard problem.  
8 See Frost [2006]. 
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Although there is a comprehensible demand-side, there is also a clear supply-side. 
The European Central Bank [ECB 2004a] points out that borrowers include triggers in 
agreements since otherwise lenders would ask for higher credit spreads. 
 
Moody’s survey [2001] indicates that out of 771 US corporations, rated Ba1 (BB+) or 
higher, 87.5% do have rating triggers.9 By contrast, Moody’s survey [2002] in Europe 
shows that 59% of 243 responded issuers reported rating triggers. Common features 
and their frequency are depicted in the table below: 
Trigger  Frequency 
Collateral, letter of credit, 
bonding provisions 21,6% 
Pricing grid 21,1% 
Acceleration 29,1% 
 of which   
 Termination 8,5% 
 Material adverse change 5,4% 
 Default  5,3% 
 Acceleration 4,0% 
 Put 3,0% 
 Early amortization 2,9% 
Other 28,2% 
Table 2: Types of rating triggers and its frequency10
Collateral, letter of credit, bonding provisions were basically found in bank loans 
contracts, wherein the feature does not affect the initially appointed credit spread but 
requires to pledge assets to guarantee the financing. Therefore it mainly influences 
the opportunity costs of capital. 
Pricing grids are used in both bank loans and bond covenants. These features 
increase the credit spread in the event of degradation of the rating class or specified 
financial ratios. Therefore it influences the costs of capital. 
Acceleration clauses are found in both bank loans and bond agreements. They can 
include severe and critical features (e.g. acceleration on repayment or even 
premature termination of an initially long-term raised debt). Accordingly, such clauses 
provoke not only an increase in cost of capital, also an instantaneous need for new 
capital. The rating triggers with the gravest consequences are most commonly used. 
 
                                            
9 Although, there are reasons to assume that the picture may has changed and the use has declined, 
unfortunately, to my knowledge, there is no comprehensive survey available which approves that. 
10 See Moody’s [2001]. 
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In this context, the value of the credit rating as contingency clause stems not only 
from the informational aspect (reducing asymmetric information and transaction 
costs), also from the character of being simplified, standardized and from an 
independent party. A downgrade, as external event, is published broadly and is 
therefore easy to identify and date. Although a credit rating is “just” the CRA’s 
“opinion” about the creditworthiness of a borrower, it creates legal rights due to rating 
triggers and is used as if it constitutes an objective measure for creditworthiness. 
Accordingly, credit ratings are valuable also by reason of creating and enforcing legal 
rights.11  
2.3.2. Structured Finance Transactions 
In structured finance transactions got CRAs an interesting and substantial role, 
essentially in Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). A credit derivative is a private 
contract, wherein one party pays another party to overtake the credit risk of one or 
more issues and therefore has to cover the second party possible losses or defaults 
of the issues. A credit derivative enables to transfer credit risk, primarily used to 
reduce balance sheet requirements. The simplest form is a Credit Default Swap 
(CDS). Herein sells one party credit default protection for a premium and pays in the 
event of default. The other party pays a premium for transferring the credit risk and is 
paid in the event of default. Credit derivatives came up in the mid-1990s, but notice, 
in a CDS-transaction is a CRA not yet directly involved.12
 
Another established credit derivative is the Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO). A 
CDO is a structured, leveraged transaction invested in different asset classes. In 
such a transaction transfer companies, so-called originators, rights to payment from 
income producing assets (accounts receivable, loans and lease rentals; generally 
“receivables”) to the special-purpose entity (SPE). A “true-sale” comprises a 
continuation of repayment to the SPE’s investors, even in the event of default of the 
originator. At the core of such a CDO is a “bankruptcy-remote” SPE that issues 
differently rated securities to investors. If some of the SPE’s assets (receivables) 
default, the most junior securities (investors) take the first loss; therefore, the most 
 
11 See ECB [2004a] for a detailed discussion of the consequences from the use of rating triggers. 
12 See Partnoy [2006] for more detail, especially concerning the role of CRAs in structured finance 
transactions. 
 senior securities are rated higher than the average of the collateral pool’s ratings 
would be.13  
 
CRA  … Credit Rating Agency 
rec. … receivables 
SPE … Special-Purpose Entity 
Figure 1: Depiction of a CDO 
An important fact has to be noted: CRAs are herein involved directly and the risk of 
underlying a conflict of interest rises. Consider, a CRA rates a SPE “AAA” and is in 
the position of creating legal rights. The CRA certifies the transfer of right on payment 
(receivable) from the originator to the SPE even in the event of default, hence, 
constituting a “true-sale”. Further, the CRA helps and sells structuring this transaction. 
Accordingly, if the CRA defines how the CDO looks like and afterwards rates the SPE, 
the risk rises not being independent and not being perceived reputable in rating the 
SPE “AAA”. In other words, the involved parties care about the 
“bankruptcy-remoteness” most and that’s the core the structure is build up and also 
the main point sold. Accordingly, the CRA rates and certifies its own work in 
structuring a high rated CDO-transaction. 
 
                                            
13 See S&P [2002] and Schwarcz [2001] for a closer description of CDOs. 
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In this context, the value of the credit rating stems not only from the informational 
aspect, more from the certification and guaranteeing aspect for the validity of the 
transaction (the asset sale). Hence, the CRA acts more like an external auditor and is 
therefore more difficult to replace compared to its role as information gatherer. For 
instance, in the “traditional business” of CRAs make buy-side and sell-side firms 
there own analysis and assessment of credit risk. 
2.4. The Regulatory Relevance 
Financial regulators established numerous restrictions and rules wherein CRAs are 
used as easy manageable, simplified, datable, broadly publicized external tool to 
measure credit risk. For instance, Rule 15c3-1 (SEC 1975) applies favorable net 
capital requirements concerning investment-graded securities for broker dealers. 
Rule 2a-7 (Investment Company Act 1940) restricts money market fund investments 
to high quality short-term securities. The Standardized Approach (Basel II, in general, 
in BIS 2004; European implementation in CRD 2006a,b) allows banks to determine 
credit risk, therefore the net capital requirements and risk-based credit spreads 
through an external rating. 
Ratings from CRAs designated as NRSRO (“Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organization”; U.S.-regulation) or ECAI (“External Credit Assessment Institution”; 
Basel II) are used to evaluate whether securities fulfill the minimum quality standards 
and therefore, whether large and economical important investors (because of their 
investment volume) are allowed to hold those securities and to which conditions. 
2.4.1. The Regulatory License Theory14 
Based on that picture and dependency on the recognized, large CRAs established 
Frank Partnoy the Regulatory License Theory. This theory comprises that those 
CRAs (in particular Moody’s and S&P) have a fixed demand (accordingly are highly 
profitable), produce no informational value and just sell favorable regulatory 
treatment. This means that those CRAs merely profit from enabling issuers to sell 
their issuances of debt to regulated investors, which are restricted to buy or hold 
solely investment-grade rated instruments. 
 
14 See Partnoy [1999, 2001, 2006] for his Regulatory Licence Theory. 
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2.4.2. The Reputational Capital View15 
The Reputational Capital View, supported by many scholars, assumes that the credit 
rating industry is competitive and reputation-driven. Based on their accurate and 
reliable ratings acquire agencies reputation over the time. If a CRA’s reputation 
increases and other parties hold her in higher esteem, she gains reputational capital, 
a reverse of good will, on which other members rely on in transacting with that CRA. 
The gathered reputational capital leads other parties to include “trust” in their 
decision-making process and enables them to decrease transaction costs.  
 
Accordingly, a CRA which issues more accurate and valuable ratings gains more 
reputational capital. This helps in the following decision process: An investor either 
relies on the rating from a CRA or makes an independent evaluation of credit risk. 
Absent other facts, the investor will “buy” (or rely on) the rating if the expected benefit 
of the rating minus the actual cost of the rating is both positive and higher than the 
expected benefit of an independent evaluation minus the actual cost of such an 
evaluation. It can be concluded that CRAs will exist in those markets where 
economies of scale in rating activities can be achieved. This has the consequence 
that the investigation costs for the CRA are lower than the investigation costs for the 
investor. The difference between those two can be seen as “surplus” which is shared 
between them. The apportionment depends on the competitive dynamics. The net 
marginal benefit from doing an additional investigation to the CRA equals the net 
marginal benefit to the investor in a competitive market. It has to be noted that due to 
the business model used by the principal CRAs (charging the issuers) the investors 
receive the information for free. This model is possible because the institutional 
investors rely directly on the CRAs’ output (regulative portfolio restriction) and the 
issuers rely indirectly on their output due to liquidity needs (need to attract the 
regulated investors). Accordingly buy-side and sell-side firms have to compare the 
benefit of a for free obtained evaluation by the principal CRAs with the benefit of an 
independent evaluation minus the actual cost of such an evaluation.  
 
CRAs will suffer a loss in reputation if their ratings are noted as inaccurate and 
unreliable. This enables the entry for new agencies. 
 
15 My discussion of the reputation view owes essentially to Partnoy [1999, 2001]. 
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3. The Current Market Structure 
3.1. The Agencies16 
Nowadays are about 130 to 150 CRAs operating worldwide [BIS 2000]. The first 
rating agency was founded by John Moody in 1909. The predecessor of Moody’s 
Investors Service rated railroad bonds, the first bonds sold on a widely spread. Owing 
to the increase of capital needs in the industry, not satisfied by traditional means, 
additional investors were needed. The ratings helped those investors to estimate the 
benefits and costs of investing in projects where they don’t know the people 
operating in the business. The predecessor of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) was founded 
by Henry Poor in 1916. In 1941 merged the Poor’s Company with Standard Statistics, 
another information and rating company starting business in 1922, and formed S&P 
which was taken over by McGraw Hill (a publishing giant) in 1960s. Fitch started 
business in 1924 and is presently owned by FIMALAC, a French conglomerate. Its 
history is a bit more complex and it is an amalgamation of several smaller agencies: 
Fitch, IBCA, Duff & Phelps and Thompson Bank Watch.  
 
These three CRAs received NRSRO-status from the beginning of this category. By 
now are seven CRAs designated, however, the domination of the principal agencies 
did not forfeit due to this fact. The industry is dominated by two big global players, 
Moody’s and S&P, having a combined market share of about 80%. Until 2003, there 
were just three NRSROs, whereat Fitch had (and still has) a market share of 
approximately 15%.17
 
The SEC adopted, until today, eleven rating agencies into NRSRO-category:  
1982  Duff & Phelps; 
1983  McCarthy, Crisanti & Maffei (MCM); 
1991  IBCA (British rating agency; received NRSRO-status for banks and 
financial institutions); 
1993  Thompson Bank Watch (specialized for obligations of banks and financial 
institutions). 
 
16 My discussion of the agencies’ history owes essentially to Cantor & Paker [1994] and White [2006]. 
17 See Economist [06/08/2007] p. 67 and Hill [2004] p. 60 for the various market shares. 
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Due to mergers among each other and with Fitch remained in the end of 2000 the 
initial three principal CRAs. Thereafter were designated:  
2003  Dominion Bond Rating Services (DBRS; a Canadian rating agency); 
2005  A.M. Best (specialized on insurance companies); 
May 2007  Rating & Investment Information, Inc. (R&I; a Japanese rating agency); 
R&I was established in 1998 by a merger of Nippon Investors Service 
(NIS; founded 1975) and Japan Bond Research Institute (JBRI; founded 
1985). 
June 2007 Japanese Credit Rating, Ltd. (JCR); JCR was established in 1985. 
 
The profitability of CRAs, in particular of Moody’s and S&P, has been discussed and 
criticized by several scholars. For instance, Smith and Walter [2001] pointed out that 
Moody’s launched the market in 2000 and its shares showed a total return of almost 
52% in that year. In February 2001 was its P/E-ratio 21.57 and its return on assets 
exceeded 40%. Moody’s profit margins of about 50% induced an analyst to describe 
Moody’s as “the best franchise [he has] ever covered in [his] 20 years on Wall 
Street.”18 Furthermore, the same analyst appraised S&P’s margins on 30%. Although 
profit estimations about Fitch are similarly difficult as for S&P (their earnings are not 
publicly available because Fitch is privately held and S&P is part of McGraw Hill), it 
can be supposed that Fitch is less profitable compared to the big two CRAs due to 
charging lower fees and having a by far smaller market share and a weaker market 
position. 
 
Moody’s had revenues of $2,037 million. 63% of its revenues arise from U.S., 26% 
from Europe and 11% from other international activities [annual report of Moody’s 
2006]. Data from S&P is largely unknown due to its corporate structure, but it can be 
supposed a similar picture. Fitch has a relatively larger presence in Europe than in 
the United States (Fitch is owned by FIMALAC, a French conglomerate, and IBCA, 
part of Fitch, was a British rating firm). Nonetheless, Fitch is also in Europe far behind 
the two large CRAs. The BIS-report [2000] states that Fitch had a corporate coverage 
of 18% whereas Moody’s and S&P had 70% each. It has to be annotated that Fitch 
merged in 2000 (after the BIS-report was publicized) with Duff & Phelps, having 
coverage of 27%.  
 
18 See NYT-article by Wayne [2002] citing Bear Stearns analyst K. R. Gruneich. 
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3.2. Usage of Moody’s and S&P – The two-rating Norm19 
Issuers typically purchase a rating from both Moody’s and S&P. Some use Fitch as 
additional rater, for instance, if the ratings of Moody’s and S&P differ. Fitch is rarely 
adopted as second and even rarer as unique rating.20 In the market has developed a 
two-rating norm, where the two ratings bought by the issuers are those of Moody’s 
and S&P.  
 
The development of this norm might be explained through a knock-on effect among 
the issuers. One issuer started to use two ratings for signaling purposes (that she has 
nothing to hide) and the others followed suit. Even though the information content of 
a second rating is supposed to be very low, the issuer expects that the market will 
reward the signal and hedging (a second agency might find what the first has 
overseen). Unclear is the reason why the equilibrium is at two ratings. A possible 
explanation for that purpose could be that the issuers obtain the highest net value 
with two ratings – benefit of the lower spread net of the cost (fee) of the additional 
rating. The third rating might constitute no extra value, because no additional 
information is expected from it. Thus, the two-rating norm might has established. The 
reasons for the election of Moody’s and S&P may be rooted in there long history, size 
and prominence. 
 
By now the norm is established and several reasons lead to an easy persistence. 
Consider a money management firm, investing in rated bonds on behalf of its clients. 
Therein, the single employee – doing the day-to-day business – has his from the firm 
predetermined guidelines, practices and standard forms, which are designed for 
investing in Moody’s- and S&P-rated bonds. Given that, the employee has no motive 
to deviate from that. Nor the company which set up those guidelines and standard 
forms has any motivation to adjust or change them. Rather, the structure of 
incentives for the individual within the company leads to reduce efforts for changing 
forms. The reason for such incentive structures is justified in the aim of holding 
transaction costs low. 
 
19 My discussion of the development of the two-rating norm and its easy persistence due to existing 
incentive structures owes essentially to Hill [1997, 2002, 2004]. 
20 See Cantor and Packer [1996] and Jewell and Livingston [1998] for multiple ratings and their effect 
on the credit spread. 
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Furthermore, such guidelines, practices and standard forms constitute a 
process-based standard and quality management which produces an accepted 
measure of safety for investment decisions. This “safety” becomes an important 
matter in lawsuits by clients, on whose behalf the money management firm made 
unprofitable decisions. Courts have incorporated with favor if ratings of Moody’s and 
S&P are used in the investment decision process.21
 
Furthermore, money management firms and their individual managers are 
benchmarked, how well they are doing their business relative to certain indices. 
These indices consist of ratings by Moody’s and S&P and reflect their performance. 
As much as the firm and also the single manager might desire to outperform these 
indices, they cannot reliable do that. In fact, they are better off in trying to do no 
worse. In consideration of that fact is the best procedure to accomplish that to mimic 
the index.  If the manager decides to try to outperform the relevant index she has to 
take risks out of the norm. Furthermore, if she fails in performing better, she runs the 
risk of getting fired. By contrast, if the manager mimics and not takes risks, even if 
the level of her performance is low, there is no distinction form the relevant 
benchmark (this benchmark can be a bond-index or an average in-house 
performance of several managers) and therefore she runs no risk of getting fired. The 
problem holds for both the single manager and the money management firm. 
Chevalier and Ellison [1998] showed that young managers lose more likely their job if 
their fund’s beta deviates from their pear group. Compared to older managers they 
take on lower unsystematic risk and deviate less from the typical behavior. 
 
 
21 The court stated in George T. Glennie v. Abitibi-Price Corp., 912 F. Supp. 993, (W.D. Mich. 1996): 
“[E]ven though the ratings of Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s are not per se determinative of 
prudence, they are significant factors in deciding whether an investment is prudent. That is, the 
ratings are important information that a fiduciary should consider in deciding whether a particular 
GIC [guaranteed investment contract, a type of investment vehicle] should be purchased for plan 
participants. This would be especially true of low ratings; a fiduciary of a plan would almost 
certainly violate the fiduciary duty if the fiduciary caused the plan to purchase a GIC in an 
insurance company with ratings below “investment grade.” Consistently high ratings from the 
ratings agencies are also important. In the instant case, even though there were two downgrades 
of MBL [the life insurance company from which the GIC was purchased] in the months preceding 
February 14, 1991, and even though these downgrades and other reports pointed out MBL’s 
exposure to non-performing mortgages and real estate, the downgrades and reports are balanced 
with favorable comments about MBL. Even considering the exposure, the ratings remained 
“investment grade.” Further, as previously noted, even after the 1990 downgrades, MBL fit into the 
Plan’s ratings guidelines.“ 
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Not only the buyer of rated debt securities has an incentive, but also, the buyer of the 
ratings has an incentive to maintain the two-rating norm. A CEO will be definitely 
second-quested if he purchases not two ratings – namely from Moody’s and S&P – 
for his company and respectively for an issue. The contempt of the norm implies an 
unnecessary-to-take, high downside risk. The very fact that the second rating pays 
for itself (cheaper financing due to lower spread accepted by the investors), brings 
forth both parties (issuers and investors) to perpetuate the two-rating norm.  
3.3. Competition among the Credit Rating Agencies 
Standard economic theory assumes a less intense competition for industries with 
severe entry barriers and few market players than for industries with more players 
and less entry barriers. In the traditional market of the rating industry, the two big 
players do not need to compete due to the issuers are purchasing ratings of both 
Moody’s and S&P. Hill [2004] highlights that both know that neither of them can 
squeeze out the other of the market and their high profit margins give reason to 
suppose that they do not compete on price too. 
 
However, in new markets, especially in non-US-markets, it seems that Moody’s and 
S&P do compete with each other and that one rating agency can capture a market 
share at the expense of the other. Two circumstances may lead to a stronger 
competition between them both. First, the two-rating norm may not has established in 
such markets in that way as in the U.S. Second, as an additional (second) rating can 
be used a local, specialized rating agency. Globalization got an interesting driver in 
the credit rating industry. Although Moody’s and S&P are also globally, the dominant 
players, they differ in prominence and their market share outside the U.S. [BIS 2000]. 
For instance, Moody’s is more prominent in Asia, whereas S&P more in Latin 
America. For Europe, in the aggregate, can be made no distinction, although, there 
are little differences on national basis (e.g. S&P is in France and Moody’s is in the 
Netherlands more prominent). The survey detected several smaller rating agencies, 
specialized geographically or on a certain sector. Hill [2004] notes that at least in one 
part of structured finance (private label mortgage securities) has arisen real 
competition between Moody’s and S&P. They competed in a reduction of required 
credit enhancement levels and made a strategic use of unsolicited ratings. Fitch and 
at that time also Duff & Phelps got important market players. Fitch accomplished to 
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be the second agency used (with Moody’s) when it entered the market, requiring 
credit enhancement levels lower than those that where required by S&P. 
 
Fitch, the third and considerably smaller market player, operates in both the 
traditional and new market sectors much more competition-focused than the two big 
players. In the later worked Fitch hard and aggressive to establish itself in structured 
finance. Its market share is by far higher compared with its market share in traditional 
corporate bond issue rating [Cantor & Packer 1994]. Even though the statistics are 
not the newest, the survey points out that in a – at that time – new market, Fitch was 
very well able to carve out a new niche for itself and was able to persist in 
competition against the big two. Furthermore, another strategy may be to compete in 
price and in not-price related conditions. There exists anecdotal evidence that Fitch is 
easier to deal with and also cheaper than Moody’s and S&P.22
  
A further strategy may be the issuance of more “favorable” ratings. Indeed, there are 
empirical studies underpinning the allegation, that Fitch did that for some instances. 
Cantor & Packer [1996] found that third rating agencies, such as Fitch and 
Duff & Phelps, issue higher ratings compared to Moody’s and S&P. Reason for it may 
be a more lenient rating process or their policy of rating on request inducing a 
selection-bias. According to anecdotal evidence confirms that also the market 
perception by thinking that Fitch gives higher ratings. The possibility for a new or 
small agency to compete with that strategy and the out of it resulting threat by the 
market constitutes an entry barrier. It makes it difficult to start business and it takes a 
long time to build up reputational capital in form of proving not to use such a strategy 
to increase the market share. 
 
In-between Moody’s and S&P there is no competition in the issuance of favorable 
ratings. Empirical studies proved that. If both differ in their rating there is no evidence 
that one agency rates higher than the other. Ratings by Moody’s and S&P are both 
conservative; by contrast, Fitch’s are not. Cantor & Packer [1994] found some 
smaller agencies whose ratings were lower than those of Moody’s and S&P (MCM 
 
22 Hill [2004] cites anecdotal evidence that Fitch is cheaper and issues higher ratings compared to 
Moody’s and S&P. The market perception sees them both more conservative and comparable in their 
assessment. 
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and DBRS). Market perception reflects that and sees both big agencies as 
conservative and comparable in their evaluation methods. Empirical work indicates 
that both became more conservative over the time [Blume, Lim and Mackinlay 1996]. 
3.4. Regulatory Usage and Size of Agencies 
Comparing the size of the CRAs, used for regulatory purposes or not, with the 
relevance of their ratings, the following interesting differentiation can be made.  
 
Size, in terms of analysts employed, shows that most non-NRSROs employ less than 
30 people, one exception is Dun & Bradstreet, with about 11.000 people. It offers 
ratings on millions of firms but does not issue specific bond ratings. Dun & Bradstreet 
was the former parent of Moody’s. Moody’s, S&P and Fitch have more than 1.000, 
A.M. Best about 400 and the for a short time designated JCR and R&I had 74 and 
140 employees in the year 2000. JCR’s has by now 90 employees.23
Size, in terms of the geographic distribution of ratings, shows that most non-NRSROs 
only operate and distribute their ratings in their home country.  
Size, in terms of coverage and ratings assigned, does not offer to differentiate 
between designated or not as NRSRO. This can be explained by the fact that a solely 
quantitative rating model enables an agency to rate issuers globally without operating 
in the issuers country and without talking to the issuer’s management for making a 
qualitative analysis too.24
 
Accordingly, it can be followed that the largest rating agencies are recognized as 
NRSRO or ECAI and regarding the “whose rating”-problem is that application 
comprehensible. The “whose rating”-issue, discussed by White [2006], covers the 
problem to prevent a bogus rating agency to rate any issue “AAA” for a certain 
amount of money. However, the question which rises up is, if the largest CRAs are 
recognized (ex-post) or if the recognized CRAs became the largest ones due to the 
favorable regulatory treatment and further, how strong is the “traditional” 
informational value argument for the designated and for the not-designated CRAs? 
 
 
23 Data from their website; (http://www.jcr.co.jp/english; last visit September 2007). 
24 Data of size from BIS [2000] p. 21. 
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A transactional and regulatory relevance can be found only in the ratings of the 
principal CRAs. The regulatory use (NRSRO- or ECAI-designation) builds up solely 
on them  because of the “whose rating”-problem. Also in contracts are just the ratings 
of the principal CRAs used for contingency clauses, simplifying and accelerating 
agreements, and thus decreasing contract and negotiation costs. The reason for that 
limited use might be the same as for the regulatory use. Additionally relies the trust in 
the principal CRAs on the reputational capital obtained by them, which is definitive 
higher compared to smaller, not-designated CRAs.  
Except of the few principal NRSROs, CRAs finance themselves by charging investors 
through subscription fees. Hence, the information value argument is for a CRA, which 
is not designated, even stronger because of the fact of being paid by the party who is 
able to substitute the agencies output and nevertheless uses the rating for 
investment decisions and therefore, is not operating in an indirect fixed-demand 
market due to the favorable regulatory treatment. Investors paying fees to such CRAs 
believe that the informational value exceeds the actual cost of the rating and is 
greater than the expected value of an independent evaluation minus the costs of 
such an evaluation. 
 
Indeed, it can be expected that the favorable regulatory treatment, especially in the 
U.S., helped Moody’s and S&P to grow up in their protected home market and gave 
them an extra leverage in their activities worldwide. This leverage has its seeds in the 
financial strength achieved in the U.S. market and in the fact that the global financial 
market is geared to the U.S. 
 
However, it has to be noted, Moody’s, S&P and Fitch are operating since the 
beginning of the last century. They had a lot of time to build up reputational capital 
and financial strength to conquer foreign markets. Furthermore, already in the market 
and directly admitted into the NRSRO-category in 1975 gave them an extra 
advantage to its competitors.  
Nonetheless, “young” CRAs like JRC25 and R&I26 have been designated as NRSRO 
quite recently this year. This shows that by now regulators are up to recognize 
 
25 JRC was founded 1985 and designated as NRSRO in June 2007 and as ECAI (in France) in 2007. 
26 JBRI (founded 1975) merged with NIS (founded 1985) to R&I in 1998 and designated as NRSRO in 
May 2007. 
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agencies that proved for several years their informational valuable output. In other 
words, if the informational value is warranted, the agency’s rating qualifies for 
regulatory and contractual use. This is an important step in the right direction, having 
in mind that few years ago an Egan-Jones-principal (U.S. rating agency) said that a 
SEC-official told him: “We won’t tell you the criteria [for obtaining NRSRO 
designation], otherwise you might qualify.”27
4. Reasons for the Market Structure 
Historically had the credit rating industry at no time a large number of general 
purpose rating agencies, neither before NRSRO-designation took effect nor 
thereafter. There are natural, historical and regulatory forces (entry barriers) limiting 
the competition in the credit rating industry. 
4.1. Natural Reasons 
Mergers and acquisitions limited market participants in the credit rating industry. 
U.S. regulators designated Duff & Phelps (1982) and MCM (1983) as NRSROs, and 
IBCA (1991) and Thomson BankWatch (1992) as “limited”-NRSROs for banks and 
financial institutions. MCM was integrated in Duff & Phelps in 1991. IBCA acquired 
Fitch in 1997, whereat the main reason for that purpose was doubtless the 
“frustration with its inability to expand its NRSRO designation beyond bank ratings.”28 
Thompson BankWatch achieved in 1999 an up-grade on general purpose 
NRSRO-status and finally, in December 2000 it became integrated into Fitch. 
Duff & Phelps was integrated into Fitch in April of 2000. Accordingly, in the end of 
2000 remained the primarily three principal CRAs. Fitch merged with all upcoming 
CRAs that had a “serviceable” corporate coverage. 
 
The fewness might be explained to a certain extent by economies of scale and scope. 
In addition is standardization a driver which should not be underestimated. The 
credibility of an agency’s rating and the exposure to it is build up on reputation. This 
grows with the far-reaching extent and coverage of bond issues and the herewith 
 
27 Cp. Economist [8/02/2003] p. 65; also see for more detail about that incident Hill [2004] p. 55. 
28 Cp. White [2001] p. 11. 
 achieved experience. Investors tend to prefer some few standardized ratings, 
whereat they know the publishers and are able to easily compare them with each 
other. The mapping in-between the various agencies’ output is important for them. 
White [2001] compares the equity evaluation market with the credit rating market, 
where fixed-income investors are less open to varied opinions due to the comparative 
plain-vanilla probability-of-default evaluation done by the CRAs. For equity 
instruments are gain and loss expectations much more fundamental and the 
prediction is more complex and judgmental.  
4.2. Development of the Bond Capital Market (U.S. v. Europe) 
The fewness of market participants outside the U.S. may be best explained by the 
former less developed bond capital market in other countries. The international 
outstanding bond market debt is estimated to approximately $50 trillion of which 
about $28 trillion are issued in the U.S.29  
 
Domestic Debt securities 
 
Figure 2: Domestic debt securities (percentage of the outstanding volume in developed countries)30
The European bond market is smaller in terms of outstanding volume compared to 
the U.S. market. Domestic debt securities (in developed countries) have an overall 
outstanding volume at the end of 2006 of USD 45,066 billion. The Euro-area 
countries overtook Japan and the U.S. proportion remained almost constant. 
 
                                            
29 Data derived from research reports published by the Securities Industry and Financial Market 
Association SIFMA [2007] on its website.  
30 Data derived from BIS [2004b, 2007] and ECB [2004b].  
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 International Bonds and Notes 
Interestingly, on the international bond market (outstanding volume USD 17,574 
billion at the end of 2006) gained the Euro huge importance. Regarding 
internationally raised debt, is the share of Yen-denominated bonds shrinking and the 
Euro got ahead of the USD in 2003. The ECB identified two issues associated with 
this development: First, there is more competition between the market segments and 
second, there are more different issuer types in the Euro-area.  
 
Figure 3: Currency of international bonds and notes (percentage of outstanding volume)31
Indeed, Europe measured up to the U.S. in recent years, not just due to the unified 
currency, but the historical fact that investors paid fewer attention on the bond than 
on the equity market, may had induced a fewer need for CRAs to pierce the fog of 
information asymmetries between the issuers and the investors.32 The report of the 
ECB [2004b] sees as chief cause for the historical under-development in coverage of 
credit ratings the greater reliance on bank intermediation. Nevertheless, the report 
highlights a catching-up effect in Europe and a rapidly growing Euro bond market 
since the advent of the Euro, coming along with an increase in coverage and use of 
credit ratings. The Euro launch eliminated the currency risk and enabled investors to 
concentrate on credit risk in an enlarged investment environment. This diversification 
in investors’ portfolios increased the need for credit ratings since they knew the 
issuers from those new countries less than the issuers from their home countries. 
This driver broadened on one hand the investor base and on the other hand 
increased the competition and the need for companies to publish their 
creditworthiness. However, the less pronounced use of credit ratings may be 
                                            
31 Data derived from BIS [2004b, 2007] and ECB [2004b]. 
32 See for the development of the European bond market, for instance, CEPS [2005] or ECB [2004b].  
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explained with the slow financial disintermediation process. In 2004 represented in 
Europe bank loans about 50 to 70% of banks’ financial assets, while in U.S. about 
25%. Given that banks (theoretically) monitor and rate their debtors internally, there 
is a smaller need for external rating. Accordingly, corporations start to be rated not 
until when they step in the bond market. The reason for this entry is either a financing 
lack through “traditional means” or the ability to obtain it on the bond market on better 
terms. Furthermore, with the growth of the structured finance market (ABSs, CDOs), 
which is inherently a rated market, increased the use of credit rating agencies. The 
ECB-report identified many unrated issuers from the industrial sector in Europe and 
highlighted that unlike to the U.S. these companies can raise bonded capital solely 
on “domestic name recognition”. Within the EU is the credit rating coverage quite 
inhomogeneous. This may be the result of the different financial structures with 
differently geared financial disintermediation in the various countries. In addition, it is 
a striking fact that in London and the UK respectively, a worldwide financial 
stronghold, is not one rating agency headquartered. Although, IBCA, now part of 
Fitch, was originally headquartered there. 
4.3. The Regulatory Regime – An Entry Barrier 
The goal of the safety-and-soundness regulation this regulation is to protect the 
lenders from losses that would arise if financial institutions like banks, pension funds 
or insurance companies default and it should also retain stability in the bank 
framework.  
“[I]f there is a lack of competition, the SEC is largely to blame.”33  
The regulatory use of CRAs seems to be one of the main reasons for the highly 
concentrated market structure, due to limiting entry (supply) and inducing institutional 
investors to pay direct and issuers indirect attention on credit ratings (demand). I 
investigate in detail the regulatory regime in the United States, in Europe and in some 
other countries. The development of the U.S. and the European regulation is 
consistent with the development of the bond market. Owing to the long history of 
issuing broadly distributed bonds and the coming along with it need to regulate 
investors, have started the U.S. regulators by contrast very early to use CRAs as a 
 
33 Cp. Economist [02/08/2003]. 
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tool in their “safety-and-soundness” regulation. With the globalization and the 
development of the other nations they tied up to the U.S. The bond market is still 
dominated by the U.S. and the later on established regulatory regimes in other 
countries are to some extent geared to the U.S. solution. The long history of the 
principal CRAs in the U.S. in conjunction with the obtained market power – with a 
guaranteed demand – and the establishment of regulation regimes abroad on the 
basis of the U.S.-solution gave the principal U.S.-CRAs an extra leverage in obtaining 
market power outside of their home country. 
4.3.1. The U.S. Regulatory Framework34 
The Credit Rating Industry gained in two critical periods, the 1930s and 1970s, 
agency power and profitability. In 1936 tied up the Office of the Comptroller of 
Currency (OCC) to the fractional write-off rule for non-investment-grade rated bonds 
(see Wall Street Journal [1931]) with a much stronger and far-reaching restriction 
which persists until today: Banks are prohibited to hold any instruments rated 
non-investment-grade in their portfolios. This rule was extended for pension funds, 
insurance companies and other financial institutions. Those regulated institutional 
investors account for a majority of overall investment volume.  
“Bond issuers were forced to look to the rating agencies as sources of 
authority concerning their bond issues, regardless of what information the 
rating agencies generated.”35
The credit raters hold the key to the capital and liquidity, the lifeblood of 
corporate America and of our capitalist economy. The rating affects a 
company’s ability to borrow money; it affects whether a pension fund or a 
money market fund can invest in a company’s bonds; and it affects stock 
price.36
In conjunction with establishing Rule 15c3-1 (net capital requirements for broker 
dealers) the SEC noticed and solved the “whose rating”-problem: It existed no rule 
preventing a bogus rating agency to rate any issue “AAA” for a certain amount of 
money. The SEC solved that by establishing the term “Nationally Recognized 
 
34 My discussion of the regulatory history owes essentially to Partnoy [1999, 2001], and White [2001, 
2002-2003, 2006]. 
35 Critical statement of Frank Partnoy [2001], p.10. 
36 Statement by Josef Lieberman [2002] (“Hearings before the Senate Commission on Governmental 
Affairs”); For deeper discussion concerning stock returns and stock liquidity see, for instance, 
Dichev and Piotroski [1998], Linciano [2004], and Odders-White and Ready [2003]; concerning the 
matter how credit ratings influence capital structure see Kisgen [2006]. 
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Statistical Rating Organizations” (NRSROs) and restricted that only a rating by a 
CRA designated as NRSRO is allowed to be taken into account for fulfilling 
regulatory minimum quality standards. The SEC did not state any specific criteria for 
the admission into this category and designated immediately as NRSROs the 
preexisting principal CRAs (Moody’s, S&P and Fitch). The SEC adopted until today 
eight further rating agencies into this category. Owing to mergers are nowadays 7 
CRAs designated as NRSRO. 
 
In 1997 proposed the SEC requirements potential new rating agencies have to fulfill 
for admission into the NRSRO-category. 37  The considered attributes were an 
alignment of “catch 22” conflicts, concentrating mainly on inputs.38 As a consequence 
of the Enron debacle in 2001 proposed the SEC a new set of criteria for admitting 
into the NRSRO-category in April 2005.39 The proposed set of criteria has slightly the 
character of mirroring and freezing the present circumstances of providing 
information about the creditworthiness of borrowers. First, the proposal reflects the 
current used business model by the main CRAs (“be disseminated on a widespread 
basis at no cost”; “average number of issues covered by analysts”; cp. SEC [2005b]). 
There are of course other business models already used by particularly smaller rating 
agencies. They finance themselves through subscription fees from investors and run 
by small staffs. The matter of how many issues are covered by one analyst gives 
standing alone no valuable information: An increase might be a signal for stretching 
resources too thinly or might be a signal for an improvement in effectiveness and 
innovation. White [2001] highlights that this question can only be answered through 
measuring the core CRAs should do and as which tool they are used in the 
regulatory framework: the quality of their output (effectiveness in forecasting default 
rates in certain rating categories). In addition, the proposal comprises pretty the same 
“catch-22” conflict as the proposal form 1997 (“generally accepted in the financial 
markets” and linked “to the views of the predominant users of securities ratings”; 
“contacts with the managements of issuers”; cp. SEC [2005b]). Naturally, this creates 
 
37 See SEC [1997] for the criteria. 
38 The term “catch-22” is based on the novel of the same title publicized by Joseph Heller in 1961. He 
describes that a pilot in the second world war could become unfit to fly only if he is insane. That he’s 
insane he demonstrates in continuing to make those perilous flights. The ask for attesting that he’s 
unfit to fly shows that he’s not insane because the worry about his life demonstrates that he’s still sane. 
The term “catch 22” became common for such dilemmas. 
39 See SEC [2005b] for the new set of criteria. 
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a barrier to new entrants. How should their ratings become generally accepted and 
how should they build up contacts to the management of issuers without being a 
NRSRO. Which corporate manager wastes time in talking to a CRA (explaining his 
story of the issue and/or company) or even pays for a rating when he can not use the 
rating for obtaining additional investors? 
 
Besides, the proposal allows presuming that an admission into the NRSRO category 
is of permanent character. Therefore, it is possible to fulfill the requirements before 
designation but afterwards performing very shoddy. Even after debacles like Enron, 
which provoked large attention, the matter of defrocking a CRA from NRSRO-status 
was never discussed.40 In addition makes it the entry barrier, which constitutes the 
NRSRO-designation criteria, difficult to enter the market through an innovative way of 
determining credit risk and probability of default. White [2006] stated that such 
methods, technologies or institutions – being better or more suitable for risk 
evaluation – could falter if the principal NRSROs fail to embrace them. 
4.3.2. The European Regulatory Framework 
Basel I, 1988, required a regulatory capital of 8% for banks. The guideline was 
prepared for stabilizing the banking sector worldwide, and had been translated into 
national law, according to Credit Suisse [2004], in over 100 countries. 
 
The use of CRAs as a tool in the European regulation is young compared to the 
United States and additionally can be seen that the developed regime is to some 
extent geared towards the U.S.-framework. Under auspices of the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) guides the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision 
in the New Capital Adequacy framework how internationally operating banks should 
be forced to calculate regulatory capital.41 The banks can calculate the risk-weighted 
regulatory capital either with the “Standardized Approach” or with the “Internal 
Ratings-based Approach” (IRB-Approach). With the Standardized Approach is the 
 
40 Although, the criticism of the CRAs in this scandals has to be made carefully, because, for instance, 
in the case of Enron there was a lot of fraud done by the management and CRAs do not substitute 
external auditors. They generally have to rely on the information provided by the companies and have 
to trust in its truth. 
41  Cp. Frost [2006]; For discussion of the role of credit ratings in the New Capital Adequacy 
Framework see, for example, Altman and Saunders [2001], Altman, Bharath, and Saunders [2002], 
Cantor [2001], and Linnell [2001]. 
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credit risk measured by External Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAIs); which are 
nationally recognized rating agencies. The IRB-approach allows the banks to 
calculate the credit risk by using their internal rating systems. 
 
The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) coordinates the translation 
of BASEL II into national law in Europe and proposed that the recognition of ECAIs 
can be done by two ways: direct or indirect. A direct recognition requires the national 
supervisor to make his own evaluation whether the CRA complies with the 
recognition criteria for an “eligible ECAI”. An indirect recognition allows the national 
supervisor to recognize a CRA in his country without doing an evaluation, if this CRA 
is already recognized in another Member State (ruled in CEBS 2006 and 
CRD 2006a). 
 
The BIS-guideline [2004a] states the following six criteria for an “eligible ECAI”: 
Objectivity, Independence, International Access and Transparency, Disclosure, 
Resources and Credibility. 42 Regarding the criteria for admitting into ECAI-category 
holds almost the same criticism done above for the NRSRO-category. It creates the 
same “catch 22” conflict constituting an entry barrier (evaluation of credibility and 
market acceptance through the “market share of the ECAI”; “extent of its contact with 
the senior management of the entities which it rates”; CEBS [2006] at 22) and 
continues to focus on inputs (eg. “staffing and expertise of the ECAI”; CEBS [2006] at 
20). Furthermore it limits the business models used for assessing creditworthiness 
(“credit assessments are accessible at equivalent terms … to all [domestic and non-
domestic] credit institutions”; “Credit assessments that are made available only to a 
limited number of entities shall not be considered to be publicly available.”; CEBS 
[2006] at 25).  
 
Until now, 30 European States started implementing the guideline into national law.43 
That the criticism of the admission-criteria is justified and the consequence is pictured 
 
42 See BIS [2004a]. The CEBS [2006] specifies the criteria (referring to CRD [2006a] Annex VI, Part 
2.1 “Methodology”). 
43 The existing Member States (June 2007) are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and UK. 
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in Table 3. It shows which CRAs are admitted to ECAI-category in CEBS-Member 
States. 
 Moody's S&P Fitch DBRS JCR COFACE44 Banque de France
Austria i i i i    
Belgium d d d     
Bulgaria i i i     
Cyprus i i i     
Estonia d d d     
Finland d d d d    
France d d d d d d d 
Germany d d d d    
Greece d d d     
Ireland i i i i    
Latvia d d d     
Lithuania i i i     
Luxembourg d d d     
Malta i i i     
Netherlands d d d d    
Norway i i i     
Poland i i i     
Portugal d d d     
Slovenia d  d     
Spain d d d d    
UK d d d     
        
coverage 100% 95,2% 100% 33,3% 4,8% 4,8% 4,8% 
coverage (d) 61,9 % 57,1% 61,9 % 23,8% 4,8% 4,8% 4,8% 
coverage (i) 38,1% 38,1% 38,1% 9,5% 0 0 0 
Table 3: direct (d) or indirect (i) recognized ECAIs in CEBS-Member-States45
The principal NRSROs have coverage of almost 100% (only S&P is not “yet” 
recognized in Slovenia). DBRS, recognized as NRSRO in 2003, covers one third. It 
has to be annotated that not even all current NRSROs received ECAI-status, not to 
mention any local European CRAs. Interestingly, France breaks ranks and admitted 
additionally JCR, recognized as NRSRO in June 2007, COFACE and the Banque de 
France. On grounds of indirect recognition the recognition in France of JCR might 
facilitate for the agency to become accepted also in the other Member States. The 
comparatively cheap indirect recognition was used especially by smaller countries. 
Beside the “catch 22” conflict in the admission criteria similar to the U.S. solution 
                                            
44 COFACE, headquartered in France, is a global active credit insurance company, making 87% of its 
revenues in Europe. Selling company information is its second largest business segment, amounting 
9.3%; Insurance amounts 79.7%. See financial report COFACE [2006]. 
45 Used data, published until July 2007, either by the CEBS or by the national authorities responsible 
for the supervisory disclosure. Until June 2007, nine Member States haven’t published and/or done the 
recognition of ECAIs. 
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might be the fewness in nationally recognized ECAIs (on average 3,4) explained by 
the following: Basel II includes an ongoing oversight of the recognized ECAIs, which 
means that it is comparatively the more expensive solution. The more ECAIs are 
recognized, the more ongoing oversight is necessary and the more costs arise. 
Assuming that the national supervisors tend to hold ongoing costs low, they solely 
recognize the big players. Those generate presumable fewer ongoing costs and fulfill 
easier the admission criteria. By all means have to be recognized at least the 
principal CRAs for not harming the national industry. Owing to the globalization would 
constitute a solely admission of the local CRAs a competitive disadvantage. Possibly 
eases the indirect recognition that conflict. That remains to be seen. 
4.3.3. Differences in European and U.S. Regulatory Framework 
The Basel II accord expands the role of CRAs in the “safety-and-soundness” 
regulation and of supervisors in limiting the entry into the international credit rating 
industry. Nevertheless, the regulatory reliance on CRAs and degree of transferring 
power to them is far less pronounced in Europe than in the U.S. National regulators 
may recognize as “eligible ECAIs” not only CRAs, but also credit insurance 
companies as well as entities publicly owned that carry out credit risk. France made 
use of that possibility and recognized COFACE (credit insurer) and the Banque de 
France. This may help to emerge a less concentrated market structure. Although 
both regulatory regimes strengthen the demand for assessments of creditworthiness 
is the limitation in supply in the European regime less pronounced.  
 
The national authorities for regulation are required to implement a “Mapping”-process. 
This mapping should guarantee a valid correlation between the issued credit ratings 
by ECAIs and the risk weightings of debt. Consequently, the consulted credit risk 
(quality) builds up not that directly on the credit ratings issued by ECAIs. 46  
Furthermore, European regulators are forced to do much more ongoing oversight and 
regulatory work. At least an annually review on each ECAI and its compliance with 
the criteria is needed. By comparing the reliance of European and the U.S. regulators 
on CRAs is the regulatory value for the U.S. regulators is by far higher. A 
benefit/cost-analysis of reliance on CRAs compared to other substitutes (for instance, 
 
46 See CRD [2006b] Annex VI, Part 2.3 “Mapping”. 
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alternative regulatory schemes or IRB-approach) shows that the delegation of power 
and competence is lower in Europe. National authorities for regulation have to face 
much more ongoing costs and regulatory work. In other words, the efficiency by the 
U.S. regulators with a complete delegation is very high due to the lack of supervise 
and performance evaluation of once recognized rating agencies. This will change 
immediately when U.S. regulators adopt in there NRSRO-based framework an 
ongoing oversight, depending to whatever extent that will be done. 
4.3.4. Global Facets of Regulation47 
The BIS-report [2000] surveyed the use of CRAs in financial regulation, especially in 
banking supervision, across 18 countries. The report highlighted that in eleven out of 
twelve member countries were used CRAs in financial regulation (Germany 
constituted the exception). Out of the non-members just Mexico did not used ratings 
in regulation. The majority of countries used ratings in their supervision of banks 
solely for determining market risk. Market risk amendment (“qualify debt security”, 
“interest rate related instrument for the calculation of the capital requirement for 
specific interest rate risk”; BIS [2000] at 41) was encapsulated in Europe in the 
Capital Advise Directive (CAD). Beyond market risk purposes used Belgium, 
Switzerland, UK, USA, Argentina, Australia and Hong Kong ratings in their prudential 
regulation of banks. That varied from publication obligations of portfolios split by 
ratings to restrictions in portfolio mixes or tightened risk weights for credit risk 
determination based on ratings. In sum, in the surveyed countries was the use of 
CRAs as tool not that pronounced as in the U.S., but nevertheless still embedded in 
their regulation framework. 
 
47 My discussion of global facets of regulation owes essentially to the BIS report [2000] pp. 40-54. 
Given that the survey’s motivation behind was the Basel I Accord and it’s at that time upcoming 
reformation, some facts do no more reflect nowadays situation. Therefore, particularly for the 
European countries with an advanced Basel II implementation, the surveyed facts might be seen 
merely as a historical examination, highlighting the development of CRA-use in these countries. The 
18 investigated countries were Belgium, Canada France, Germany, Italy Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA (Banking Committee on Banking Supervision 
[BCBS] member states), and Argentina, Australia, Chile, Hong Kong, Mexico and New Zealand (non-
members of the BCBS). 
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Members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
Belgium       x x         x x x 5 
Canada   x x   x   x     x x   6 
France   x x x x   x x   x x x 9 
Italy       x x s       x x x 6 
Japan       x x   x x   x x x 7 
Luxembourg         x         x x   3 
Netherlands   x x x x   x x   x x x 9 
Sweden         x         x x   3 
Switzerland     x   x       x x x x 6 
UK   s s s x   s s s x x s 10 
U.S.       x x         x x x 5 
Total BCBS 4 5 7 11 1 5 4 2 11 11 8   
coverage (%) 36,4 45,5 63,6 100 9,1 45,5 36,4 18,2 100 100 72,7   
Non-Members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
Argentina       x x           x x 4 
Australia   s s s x   s s s x x s 10 
Chile     x   x         x x x 5 
Hong Kong        x     x   x x x 5 
Total non-BCBS 1 2 2 4 0 1 2 1 3 4 4   
coverage (%) 25 50 50 100 0 25 50 25 75 100 100   
             
Total 5 7 9 15 1 6 6 3 14 15 12   
coverage (%) 33,3 46,7 60 100 6,7 40 40 20 93,3 100 80   
abs. recogn. (%) 20 33,3 46,7 100 0 26,7 26,7 6,7 93,3 100 66,7   
res. recogn. (%) 13,3 13,3 13,3 0 6,7 13,3 13,3 13,3 0 0 13,3   
Table 4: CRAs absolute (x) or restricted (special-purpose) (s) recognized in various countries48
Table 4, showing the recognized CRAs in the different countries, highlights two facts. 
First, it confirms the high market penetration of the principal three CRAs and that 
there were just few “local” CRAs recognized. Second, it shows a considerable 
                                            
48 Cp. BIS [2000] p. 46. Mikuni & Co is a Japanese rating agency. Note that, though it was recognized 
in three other countries, it was not in Japan. 
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disparity in recognized CRAs by the regulating authorities. Furthermore has to be 
noted that Duff & Phelps and Thompson Bank Watch – with the highest market 
penetration after the three principal CRAs – do no more exist due to mergers with 
Fitch. In addition received solely the principal CRAs absolute status, whereas a 
noteworthy percentage in coverage of the other investigated CRAs stems from 
special-purpose status. On one hand includes a special-purpose recognition the 
thread to brand them second class and hampers them to gain market penetration. On 
the other hand means an increased special-purpose recognition a reduction in 
market concentration. This seems to outweigh that threat. 
 
The found lack in changing the list of eligible agencies might be rebutted by the fact 
that the implementation of either the market risk amendment or the CAD happened 
recently at that time (in most 1996 or 1997). There was no case reported whereat an 
agency was removed from the list due to a reason like incompetence. This throws up 
the question, whether the rating quality of the recognized agencies is that high or 
whether there is a lack in ongoing monitoring of once recognized agencies. The 
report found ongoing monitoring just by the authorities of France, Italy and Japan. 
The other regulators stated that they do such a monitoring or investigation on a listed 
agency solely when the need becomes quite obvious (for instance, very bad 
performance, increased number of rating errors). 
 
Comparing the criteria for becoming an eligible agency in those countries with the 
criteria set-up in the Basel II accord can be pointed out the following: 
The objectivity criterion was found in virtually all BCBS-members (except 
Luxembourg and UK, using market usage). For Australia and Hong Kong was found 
the objectivity criterion too. Independence and credibility was found solely in four 
countries (Belgium, Japan, Switzerland, and U.S.). Credibility is also a criterion in 
Australia and Hong Kong. Transparency is cited just in Italy. International access is 
nowhere a criterion and the above criticized resource criterion exists, of course, in the 
U.S. and in similar way also Belgium, Japan and Hong Kong. International 
recognition is used in Canada and Luxembourg, though it is unclear whether market 
usage or regulatory usage is meant. The former is a criterion in Switzerland too. In 
sum, the criteria qualify for the same criticism done for NRSRO- and 
ECAI-designation criteria. Additionally revealed the investigation that the regulators 
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do not distinguish in their use of credit ratings whether they were solicited or 
unsolicited. The exception in the report made the U.S. because their supervisors 
considered at that time to make a distinction.  
5. Problems in the Industry 
5.1. Conflicts of Interest 
A situation wherein a CRA has an economic interest in issuing a credit rating based 
on anything else than on the creditworthiness of an issuer is called a conflict of 
interest [Frost 2006]. In particular the increased relevance of ratings of some CRAs 
created those conflicts. Some conflicts have helped (and still help) the principal CRAs 
to strengthen their market position. Furthermore, it is interesting how the courts in the 
United States have dealt with those conflicts and the allegation that the CRAs’ output 
is no more reliable. 
5.1.1. Issuers, not Investors, are Charged by CRAs 
In the 1970s changed the large CRAs their business model and they started charging 
the issuers instead of the investors. Initially, the agencies collected fees from 
subscribers (investors) for gathering and analyzing information about the financial 
health of an entity. Afterwards, the agencies started selling to rated entities the 
privilege of providing information to the agency. Three facts may have lead to that 
change: First, the technological phenomenon of low-cost photocopying made it 
difficult to collect subscription fees from investors, due to the unmanageable 
“free-rider”-problem. Second, the increased demand for credible ratings required the 
CRAs to hire more expensive well-trained analysts, which could not be paid solely 
through subscription fees. And third, financial historians also allege the Penn Central 
bankruptcy in 1970. The default on $82 million of commercial paper increased the 
demand for a sophisticated level of research from the investors-side and provoked 
the willingness to pay for the certification of quality by the issuers.49
 
 
49 See Cantor and Packer [1994], Frost [2006] and White [2006] for the reasons of the business model 
change. 
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Arguably the increased regulatory relevance and the therewith coming along direct 
dependence of institutional investors and indirect dependence of issuers on credit 
ratings made this business model change possible. 
 
The fact of being paid by the party which is evaluated provoked some discussion 
about the conflict of interest. The SEC [2003a] argues that CRAs possibly issue 
favorable ratings and may be less diligent in probing for negative information due to 
their dependence on revenues. The vast majority of large CRAs’ revenues stem from 
fees. The fees depend on size and complexity of the issue. In a SEC Hearing [2002] 
declared Mr. McDaniel (President of Moody’s) that about 90% of their revenues stem 
from issuer-fees for ratings and about 10% stem from research and data services. In 
the same hearing predicated Mr. Joynt (president and CEO of Fitch) that about 90 
percent of the revenues stem from issuer-fees and about 10 percent stem from 
subscription services. 
 
It is important to state that the CRAs don’t depend on any single issuer. Partnoy 
[2006] concludes that the conflict is more systemic than individualized. S&P has 
stated that the fees of no single issuer or issuer group amount more than 2% of their 
total annual revenues.50 Therefore, it is unlikely that issuers can pressure on CRAs 
for receiving a desired rating. 
 
Furthermore, Hill [2004] assumes that the care about the CRA’s reputation in 
accuracy and reliance exceed the susceptibility in issuing a favorable rating. In the 
case of issuing paid favorable ratings, markets realizing that, would immediately 
debase the value of the CRA’s ratings. Hence, issuers would have no more reason to 
pay for being rated and the rating business becomes less profitable. 
 
In addition stated the principal CRAs that there is no link between the analyst’s 
compensation and the relationship between the CRA and the issuer. There is also no 
conjunction between the analyzing staff and the business development staff.  
 
50 See SEC [2003a] p. 41. 
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5.1.2. Ancillary Consultant Services 
Ancillary services are contracts in which CRAs act as corporate or bank consultants 
and profit from their reputations and expertise in analyzing risk. For example, large 
CRAs sell for additional fees prospects about rating affects through hypothetical 
transactions. Thereby presents an issuer a possible scenario (like a merger) to the 
CRA to understand the rating impacts of it. Another example, the large CRAs sell 
customized credit risk management services and quantitative tools (eg. for 
calculation of probability of default).  
 
The critic done by Frost [2006] and Partnoy [2006] is that if a CRA is paid for advice 
and predicted for a merger or stocks repurchase no impact on a company’s rating, it 
would be more difficult for the CRA to change the rating after the transaction is 
accomplished. The same kind of criticism also holds for risk management systems. A 
Financial Times article stated critically that CRAs are “unlikely to downgrade a bank’s 
risk capabilities if the bank has bought one of its risk systems.”51
 
Worth noting, there exist neither regulations nor restrictions for the consulting 
services of CRAs. Partnoy [2006] brings up that accounting companies or analysts in 
investment banks have to face new rules concerning conflict-of-interest-matters and 
have to accept restrictions on their activities. 
5.1.3. Unsolicited Ratings 
“Unsolicited” is a rating when a CRA bases the evaluation solely on publicly available 
information, which means, without including the firm in the rating process and getting 
paid by it. Moody’s stated that about 1% of their ratings are unsolicited.52 S&P and 
Fitch haven’t stated the amount of use, but indisputable, they make use of it. Such an 
unsolicited rating constitutes the threat for the issuer, that without her participation in 
the evaluation process, she cannot avoid negative inferences from the publicly 
available information and cannot rectify as she could do in a qualitative evaluation 
process. Hill [2004] sees limited possibility to use unsolicited ratings strategically for 
pressuring tactics. On the one hand the CRA has to face reputational costs for stating 
 
51 Cp. Radley and Marrison [2003], FT-article “A Risky New Role for the Rating Agencies”.   
52 See Klein [2004], Washington Post-article "Credit Raters' Power Leads to Some Abuses, Some 
Borrowers Say". 
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a “false” (to low) assessment. On the other hand the market may correct an 
unsolicited rating which is assumed by the investors to be too low and the issuer will 
receive better financial terms for her product as the rating would induce. Furthermore, 
it might become common that when the market knows that a rating is unsolicited, i.e. 
that it is marked as such, investors automatically presume that it is too slow. 
Nevertheless is an unjustified “non-investment-grade” rating problematic because the 
issuer has to face undeservedly bad marketability for his product and will be hurt due 
to the regulatory investment restriction.  
 
In the U.S., all large, taxable, publicly issued corporate bonds are rated either 
solicited or unsolicited by Moody’s and S&P. Frost [2006] sees as idea behind that if 
all issuers are rated, no self-selection process can develop. Such a self-selection 
would imply, that just issuers with high creditworthiness would let them rate. Smaller 
CRAs may gather reputation with unsolicited ratings. Larger CRAs may use 
unsolicited ratings for market entry purposes in new sectors or to assure a 
comprehensive coverage of rated issuers.  
 
Some alleged CRAs to use unsolicited ratings as unfair practice (termed "strong-arm" 
tactics) to assure issuer’s payment for a rating she did not requested [Nazareth 2003]. 
Regarding this allegation was one lawsuit against Moody’s, but it was dismissed 
without going to trial. The Justice Department did a three year investigation, which 
resulted in no prosecution. The aim of the inquiry commission was to examine 
whether Moody’s used the threat of unsolicited ratings to assure that the rating 
agency is hired and paid for rating purposes.53  
 
Accordingly, unsolicited ratings should be lower, but, due to two different reasons: 
First, when the allegation is valid and second, because of a self-selection process. 
Frost [2006] argues that this makes an empirical survey in some respects difficult. 
Regarding the self-selection, a survey should reveal that the creditworthiness and 
financial health of issuers with unsolicited ratings is below issuers with solicited 
ratings. Regarding the allegation of pressuring issuers with unsolicited ratings, a 
survey should reveal that these are systematically lower than solicited ratings after 
controlling and comparing all other relevant factors such as CRA, issuer’s 
 
53 See Gilpin [1999] and Woolley [1996] for more detail. 
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characteristics (creditworthiness and financial health) and time. Maybe due to the 
difficulty in differentiation, I have found little empirical work on that. Poon [2003] 
investigated on this matter following the logic, explained above. She examined a 
sample of 256 credit ratings by S&P in 15 countries during 1998-2000. Although she 
found that unsolicited ratings where lower for the whole sample, it depicts a doubtful 
significance for the pressure-allegation, because, the issuers obtaining unsolicited 
ratings had relatively weak financials, what would indicate that the self-selection 
explains the difference. 
5.1.4. Litigation in the Industry 
CRAs were blamed for issuing “wrong” ratings in the several scandals and 
accordingly were failing in their role as credible information gatherer. Furthermore, 
they were alleged to use “strong-arm” tactics for pressuring issuers to pay for being 
rated. Liability for the issued ratings got an interesting matter in the credit rating 
industry, discussed periodically especially by Partnoy. He accuses them not to bear 
any litigation risk, as other financial intermediaries have to do regularly (for instance 
investment banks).  
 
In the U.S. accomplished rating agencies to defend lawsuits successfully against 
them with two arguments: First, ratings are opinions (free speech) and are protected 
by the First Amendment. Second, ratings are extensively disclaimed and do not 
constitute any recommendation (to buy, sell or hold the rated security).54
Rating agencies (NRSROs), as an expert under Section 11, are protected from 
liability for misinterpretations in the Securities Act of 1933, Rule 436. 17 C.F.R. 
§  230.436(g)(1). The Report of the U.S. Senate Committee of Governmental Affairs 
[2002] highlights that NRSROs are not even held to a negligence standard of care for 
 
54 Moody’s “Rating Definitions – Introduction – Limitation to Uses of Ratings” states (Abridgement in 
Moody’s own language): “[C]redit ratings are, and must be construed solely as, statements of opinion 
and not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, sell or hold any securities. [They] must be 
weighed solely as one factor in any investment decision and each .. user must accordingly make its 
own … evaluation. [R]atings are [solely] grading obligations according to their credit quality, they 
should not be used alone as a basis for investment operations. [T]hey have no value in forecasting the 
direction of future trends of market price. Market price movements in bonds are influenced … by the 
credit quality … but also by changes in money rates and general economic trends, as well as by the 
length of maturity, etc. During its life even the highest rated bond may have wide price movements, 
while its high rating status remains unchanged.” 
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their work. NRSROs argue that they would not be liable for a negligence standard in 
any event because of the free-speech protection by the First Amendment.  
 
The case Quinn v. McGraw-Hill (parent of S&P) explains best the kind of allegation, 
especially done by Partnoy. 1999, Judge Wood dismissed a case against 
McGraw-Hill by Maurice Quinn, with the argument, that it was unreasonable for the 
investor to rely on the interpretation of S&P. The investor sued for negligence in 
interpretation. He invested $1.29 million in collateralized mortgage obligations rated 
“A” by S&P. Later on, the obligations were downgraded to “CCC” and finally, they 
defaulted. The closing words by Judge Wood reflect the inexistent legal meaning of 
the creditworthiness interpretation done by rating agencies: 
“While it is unfortunate that Quinn lost money, and we [Judge Wood, 
joined by the Judges Posner and Wood, Jr.] take him at his word that he 
would not have bought the bonds without the S&P “A” rating, any reliance 
he may have placed on that rating to reassure himself about the 
underlying soundness of the bonds was not reasonable.”55
Partnoy highlights the following – not so easy to dismiss – paradox: While credit 
ratings become a common tool in the “safety-and-soundness” regulation and the 
financial regulators rely on the credibility of the CRAs’ opinion, the court is saying that 
such a reliance by an investor is unreasonable. 
 
However, rating agencies like Moody’s and S&P accomplished that courts dismissed 
claims with the argument that ratings are protected opinions. Although, the reasons 
arranged for the judgment differed regarding whether the rating agencies solely acted 
as “financial journalists” or whether the agencies were deeper involved in the 
transaction. Accordingly reacted the courts on the increased relevance of CRAs and 
the arisen conflicts of interest. The evaluation of deepness of involvement by the 
credit rating agency depends mainly on two facts: First, is the rating solicited or 
unsolicited, and second, how complex is the structure of the transaction (purely 
information-gathering or more complex structures like ABSs or CDOs). For 
unsolicited ratings is the free speech argument stronger than for solicited ratings.56 
 
55 See Quinn v. McGraw-Hill, 168 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 1999), found in Partnoy [2001]. 
56 See for unsolicited ratings:  Jefferson County School District No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Services, 
Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 856 (10th Cir. 1999). See for solicited ratings: Commercial Financial Services, Inc. 
v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106, 109 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004) (Accessed at 
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=439633, September 2007). 
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For “traditional” information gathering holds the free-speech argument based upon 
that journalists are protected too, even though they are profit motivated. On the other 
hand, this argument holds not for transactions (like CDOs) wherein the CRA’s active 
role is inconsistent with traditional journalism. Interestingly was Fitch criticized for 
issuing the vast majority of its ratings on client’s request in a lawsuit covering a 
CDO-transaction.57
  
Accordingly, for Moody’s and S&P is due to their higher amount of unsolicited ratings 
a more favorable legal argumentation possible. Interestingly, from an economical 
view is the conflict of charging the issuers only systemic and not individualized. The 
reputation values more than the payment of one single issuer. An additional reason 
why Moody’s and S&P do in general very well in defending charges might be a well 
filled “war chest” backed by their market position and high profitability. 
 
Interestingly, Moody’s stated as a precaution in the year 2004 in its Form 10-K 
(annual report)58 that it faces litigation risks in the U.S. and due to its global business 
expansions increases such risk of litigation because of the missing free-speech 
protection in foreign jurisdiction [Moody’s 2005]. Nevertheless, compared to other 
gatekeepers (for instance equity analysts) might be the success in defending charges 
in the more clarified forbearing from issuing investment decisions. Equity analysts 
make buy, sell or hold recommendations, although they are typically disclaimed 
nowadays. Partnoy [2006] mentions that those disclaimers had been weaker until 
2001. 
5.2. The “Right” Rating  
Owing to the increased relevance of ratings were different characteristics needed. 
That makes it difficult to get the “right” rating and to rebut that the market is solely 
that concentrated because the sold product is actually not needed but the regulators 
generated a demand and restricted supply. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the 
 
57 See for protected “financial journalism”: In re Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), found in 
Partnoy [2006]. See for inconsistent, not protected, active role in a CDO-transaction: In re Fitch, 330 
F.2d 104, 111 (2nd Circuit 2003); (Accessed at http://caselaw.findlaw.com/data2/circs/2nd/037062P.pdf, 
September 2007). 
58 The Form 10-K, also called annual report, is an audited document required at the end of each fiscal 
year by the SEC. It reports the financial results and is sent to the shareholders. 
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principal CRAs do more than solely selling favorable regulatory treatment and that 
they provide information. If that would not be the case, the immediate cease of 
regulatory use would be the most logical solution. 
5.2.1. Characteristics of Ratings 
Frost [2006] quoted two characteristics of ratings which advance them for contractual 
use and regulatory use: stability and conservatism.  
 
With stability is meant, that a rating changes only due to fundamental modifications in 
credit risk. CRAs argue that this happens quite slowly. Accordingly, the approach of 
rating “through the business-cycle” by the principal CRAs complies this quality. This 
approach weights temporarily shocks relatively little.59  Unstable ratings can have 
profoundly adverse consequences. Rating changes, especially downgrades, don’t 
merely change the cost of funding, they can entail costly agreement renegotiations 
and oblige managers to adjust there portfolio composition. Especially downgrades 
below investment-grade can have enormous economic consequences due to the 
increased transactional and regulatory relevance. 
 
Conservatism is understood as the attribute that a larger verification is needed for 
achieving an upgrade than for a downgrade. This ensures a reduction of 
underestimating credit risk and of the probability that a corporation is classified 
financially stronger than it actually is. 
 
The different roles of the large CRAs entail conflicting needs for the characteristics of 
credit ratings. Due to their role as information supplier is demanded a high timeliness, 
therefore a fast change in rating. Due to their role in facilitating contracting and use 
for regulatory purposes rating stability is needed, therefore CRAs should take rating 
changes quite carefully because of potentially grave consequences. 
 
59 See for further discussion on rating through the cycle Amato and Furfine [2003], Cantor and Mann 
[2003] and ECB [2004a]. 
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5.2.2. Is the Product actually Needed? 
The disclosure of a regulation-driven demand and a regulation-driven restriction on 
supply in the credit rating industry induced White [2006] to raise the question whether 
the generated value by the CRAs to the securities market meets a market test. 
 
A non-regulation-driven demand constitutes the demand of the investors to pierce the 
fog of information asymmetry and the demand of issuers to distinct themselves from 
the bulk and to uncover their financial health and creditworthiness. Regulation-driven 
demand originates as follows: Issuers have to fulfill quality-standards expressed in 
ratings to be able to approach large investors, imposed by their regulative restriction 
on investments. The large investment volume of these investors and the liquidity 
need by investors provokes that the regulative caused interest in ratings by 
institutional investors generates a demand for ratings by issuers. 
Non-regulation-driven supply constitute the approximately 140 CRAs operating 
worldwide, which are not designated as NRSRO (respectively neither as ECAI or any 
comparable status) and accordingly, have solely an informational value. By contrast 
to Moody’s and S&P, in particular, they do not have a transactional or regulatory 
relevance. Regulation-driven supply constitute the NRSRO-designated CRAs (ECAIs 
respectively). Regulators use only a few CRAs for regulatory purposes.  
 
Initially, one might ask why it is discussed whether CRAs meet a market test, 
considering that CRAs do on average quite well in rating corporations (and issues) 
among their default rates. The higher rated an issue, the less likely it is to default. But 
the fact that the information the CRAs issue is valid, is not enough to assume that 
their product is needed and new to the market. As well can reflect credit ratings solely 
market outcomes, as  for instance credit spreads. 
 
The difficulty in determining the value illustrates the following consideration [White 
2006]: If the change of a CRA’s rating of an issue indicates a reaction in price (credit 
spread) of this underlying, this reaction by the market might point out that this CRA 
provides extra and useful information to the bond market about default rates. 
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Regardless of warranted correlation,60 the price reaction not necessarily stems from 
the informational value (change in default probability). The regulative restriction for 
banks holding solely investment-graded debt securities illustrates that the bond price 
change not categorical reflects the decline of the market opinion in default probability. 
A downgrade, for instance, from “AA” to “A” and the therewith combined bond price 
decline (increase of credit spread) can be justified either with the change of the 
market opinion in default probability or with the recognition that the issue felt down 
near to the regulative investment restriction. The increase of the credit spread can be 
a consequence of the liquidity problem if banks are no longer allowed to hold this 
issue. Accordingly, even if the market sees no new or additional informational content 
regarding default probability, the bond price would still decline due to drawing near to 
the investment restriction and therefore liquidity constraint. 
 
This argumentation also holds vice versa. That is the reason why, for instance, the 
BIS-report [2000] highlights that credit spreads are not adequate for measuring credit 
risk. Spreads are driven by issues such as market liquidity too. Accordingly, they 
include not only a premium for credit risk, but also one for liquidity risk. 
 
Consequently, nowadays make it the prevalent circumstances impossible to say 
whether the ratings of the principal CRAs – dominating the industry – meet a market 
test. The demand and supply are regulatory-driven and the reaction of the market on 
rating changes by the principal CRAs stems not necessarily from the provision of new, 
valuable information about the default probabilities of issuers, it also might stem from 
the changed possibility to invest in those instruments and the change in marketability. 
This disqualification can be expanded for since 1975 (NRSRO-establishment) and 
arguably even since 1930s (banks were prohibited to hold any non-investment-grade 
rated bonds). The NRSRO establishment constitutes, directly, a regulative restriction 
in supply, and indirectly a regulation driven demand, due to its therewith combined 
investment restrictions. The 1936 established prohibition for banks to hold any 
non-investment-grade rated instruments constitutes indirectly a regulation driven 
demand. By contrast, in the initial stage of the industry it qualified for such a market 
test.  
 
60 See Jewel and Livingston [1999]. A rating change by Moody’s or S&P could affect the pricing of the 
underlying issue.  
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5.2.3. The Spiral-effect of Downgrades 
Concerning their ongoing ratings (up- und downgrading) were criticized CRAs most 
and it seems they do worse. To underpin the problematic issue to get the “right” 
moment for a rating change cites Hill [2004] the spiral-effect of downgrades. 
 
A company has a certain financial health and for it suitable investors who like to take 
that certain amount of credit risk. If a CRA publishes that this certain financial health 
changed for the worse, lets assume this reveals the truth and is new information to 
the market, those investors will be no more interested to be invested in this company 
or at least want to be compensated with a higher credit spread for the higher credit 
risk. Accordingly, the company has to face a higher cost of capital, loses investors 
and therefore has an instantaneous need for new capital. Consider now, even if a 
rating does not reveal new information about the financial health of an issuer, 
accordingly the market already knows the financial health, the investors will 
nevertheless react due to contracting relevance, particular rating triggers, and 
regulatory restrictions.  
“Each downgrade causes deterioration, which may warrant a further 
downgrade, which may cause further deterioration, and so on. … In other 
words, a downgrade doesn’t just convey information - the fact that a 
downgrade has occurred is information.”61  
How would the three parties like to deal with that problem? If the CRA believes in a 
recovery of the financial health and accordingly in the creditworthiness of an issuer, it 
should desist from a downgrade regarding to its “through-the-cycle” rating approach. 
Actually it can be argued that even when a recovery would be possible, if a 
downgrade (especially below investment-grade) takes place, the disclosure of a 
worsen financial situation may self-fulfill due to the effect explained above. The 
issuers will typically prefer a slow downgrading, but the investor’s interests are less 
homogeneous. Investors who are required to sell lower rated issues due to any 
constraints may not like to do that when many others do that. 
 
Particularly after scandals like Enron had the CRAs been criticized that their 
downgrading is to slow. Thereupon reacted the CRAs and forced the pace for 
downgrades. Thereafter were criticized the CRAs for downgrading too quickly. For 
 
61 Cp. Hill [2004] p. 69. 
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instance, the Houston Chronicle [Ivanovich 2002] criticized the S&P’s downgrade of 
Williams’ credit rating (global energy and communications company). 
Those agencies "were burned by Enron," Malcolm [CEO of Williams] said. 
"They're trying to ensure something like that doesn't happen again – by 
imposing some very difficult standards for us." … By taking such a hard 
line, the nation's three credit-rating agencies – S&P, Moody's and Fitch – 
are trying to salvage their credibility after the Enron black eye, industry 
experts say.62
Accordingly, it is not that easy to get the right rating. Solely following the aim of timely 
publishing information to investors is not a highly targeted approach. The CRAs can 
not ignore how the market will react on the credit rating downgrade itself, and not on 
the information which the downgrade shall express. 
 
The regulatory relevance of the principal CRAs makes it difficult to say whether their 
output is valuable information. The contractual relevance provokes the spiral-effect of 
downgrades. Both indicate that a downgrade not simply reveals information to the 
market, the fact that a downgrade occurs is information. Owing to the increased 
relevance is a rating change information, regardless whether it reveals new 
information about credit risk. The market pays maybe unjustified attention on the 
principal CRAs. Even though the market “has” to react on their output, is this maybe 
not new, valuable information. This strengthens the recognized CRAs compared to 
the not recognized CRAs due to constituting an unjustified demand.  
5.2.4. More than Selling Favorable Regulatory Treatment 
Large CRAs do generally very well in initial ratings and in the normal course of 
business they also do fairly well in ranking the relative creditworthiness of issues and 
issuers. “The higher rated an instrument, the less likely it is to default and the longer 
it is to take to default.”63 S&P [2007] stated in their annual default study that an 
originally “BB”- or a “B”-rated issue takes 5.9 or 4.4 years to default, whereas an 
originally “CCC”-rated issue takes just 2.6 years. Furthermore, higher rated issues 
are more stable than lower ones. “AAA”-rated issues persist the following year in their 
 
62 Cp. Ivanovich [2002], article in Houston Chronicle “Energy Traders Struggle to Meet Post-Enron 
Credit Rules” p. A1. 
63 Cp. Hill [2004] p. 68. 
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rating category with 88.34 percent, whereas “CCC” to “C” rated issues persist with 
47.49 percent. 
 
Though regulatory treatment is an important aspect, has been challenged the 
Regulatory License Theory by some scholars, for instance by Hill [2004]. She argues 
that issuers are used to buy two ratings, while regulators demand only one (just in 
some cases two)64 and these two ratings are bought from the two agencies who are 
charging most for it, namely Moody’s and S&P. At least one of the ratings can be 
bought from Fitch or for a short time from the four other NRSROs. That would satisfy 
regulatory proposes in same manner and their ratings are for sure cheaper charged. 
 
Empirical studies showed that investors hold ratings by Moody’s and S&P in higher 
esteem. Accordingly, if both agencies give the same rating the issue is priced lower 
than compared to a single-rated issue or if the second rating comes from Fitch. 
Ratings differ in about 17% out of all issues with two ratings. Studies found varying 
results: Some found that they are priced at the average rating. Others found that 
investment-graded issues are priced at the average rating and that non-investment 
graded issues are priced between the average and the lower one.65  
 
Another reason to assume that principal CRAs do more than just selling favorable 
regulatory treatment is the fact that also non-investment grade rated issuers let rate 
single instruments with structural protections, which are better evaluated than the rest, 
but still non-investment grade. Hill [2004] argues that this indicates since they receive 
better financial terms for that single issuance that the ratings provide valuable 
information to the market and do not only have a regulative secured demand. 
Regulated investors are not within reach for such issuers and accordingly if the 
principal CRAs solely benefit from favorable regulatory treatment, it would be a waste 
of time and money by low rated issuers to achieve such a rating. 
 
 
64 For instance, broker-dealers are allowed to keep lower capital reserves if the securities are rated by 
at least two NRSROs investment-grade. 17 C.F.R. § 15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(E) (2003) (commercial paper); 
17 C.F.R. § 15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(F) (2003) (nonconvertible debt securities); and 17 C.F.R. § 15c3-
1(c)(2)(vi)(H) (2003) (preferred stock). 
65 See Cantor and Packer [1996] and Jewel and Livingston [1998] for differences in ratings and their 
impact on the credit spread. 
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Hence, it can be assumed that Moody’s and S&P receive the precedence to their 
competitors due to their reputational capital build up on that what they claim to do: to 
provide information.  
6. Proposals for Improvement 
6.1. The Need for Improvement66 
The present state of affairs in the credit rating industry had “hurt” investors (and 
markets), issuers as well as potential competitors. 
 
Investors and markets, in general, were hurt in scandals. Such debacles indicate that 
investors might give more credence to credit ratings than it would be justified. This 
means that, the credit ratings did not come up to their expectations, in terms of lower 
information quality and, for instance, badly timed up- and down-grades. 
 
Issuers might also be hurt in terms of paying too much. The enormous profitability of 
Moody’s and S&P gives reason to assume, that issuers are too heavily charged for 
the individual rating and that they are buying too many ratings as a result of pressure. 
The persistence of the two-rating norm might arise more likely from the pressuring 
tactics by Moody’s and S&P (through unsolicited and probable more critical ratings) 
than from the additional informational value of the second rating. The two-rating norm 
is either an efficient signaling to the market or a costly pattern of behavior. Anyhow, 
issuers might pay too much for both second and first rating in using Moody’s and 
S&P instead of a cheaper CRA. 
 
On potential entrants imposed the regulatory regime and the natural, historical and 
institutional forces severe entry barriers. These hurdles faced by new entrants give 
reason to assume that they are the most hurt party in the current situation. 
                                            
66 My discussion of “who is being hurt” owes essentially to Hill [2004]. 
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6.2. Conclusions Drawn from Scandals in the Industry 
Enron, headquartered in Houston, Texas, was an energy company which defaulted in 
December 2001. It was one of the world's leading natural gas, electricity, pulp and 
paper, and communications companies. After the revelation that its reported 
financials were based on systematic and creatively planned accounting fraud it 
defaulted. Several investigations on that default disclosed that although Enron’s 
operational business was no more that profitable, the company was able to cover and 
hide that with initially successful structured finance transactions.67 The case of Enron 
is probably the most famous scandal in the rating industry and indeed constitutes no 
triumph in performance of the principal agencies and furthermore, the industry 
certainly had to face a loss in reputation. In between mid-October and December 2nd, 
2001, after the deterioration in the published financials of Enron became revealed, 
the agencies started to revisit and downgrade the company periodically. That 
constitutes an extraordinary short period to default. Although the agencies 
downgraded Enron periodically, all three principal CRAs rated the company four days 
before bankruptcy “investment-grade”.  
Enron was just one of several debacles. Others were: “Asian Flu”, WorldCom, Global 
Crossing, Executive Life, Orange County, and Washington Power (“Woops”).68  
 
Regarding to the criticized bad performance has to be cited the following: All these 
debacles were of extraordinary character, either based on fraud and chicanery or on 
international financial crises. Indeed, to some extent is the criticism comprehensible, 
arguing that the agencies investigating in-depth on companies for determining default 
probability had to see the “red flags”. Accordingly, they had to uncover the 
discrepancies with more vigilance and ask appropriate questions. However, what is 
the job of the CRAs? Indeed, they make in-depth research on issuers, but they do 
not assert to prove what issuers’ officials tell them. The CRAs do a credit risk 
evaluation, based on trust that the publicized information is true. It has to be stated 
clearly, that CRAs can not substitute an external audit. The SEC prohibits selective 
disclosure of non-public information, mainly due to insider trading concerns [SEC 
 
67 For the chronology of the Enron case see, for instance, Hill [2003]. 
68 “Asian Flu” is a nickname for the economic recession in several Asian countries in 1997, started with 
the fall of the Thai baht. See for more information about the several scandals Ackman [2002], Coffee 
[2003], Committee of Financial Services [2003] and Hill [2003, 2004]. 
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2000; Reg FD], but grants issuers an exceptional right to provide information to CRAs, 
if the information helps to develop the credit rating and is disclosed solely for that 
purpose. The rating has to be publicly available. This exception should improve the 
value and quality of credit ratings. Nevertheless, both Frost  [2006] and Hill [2004] 
point out that notwithstanding the exemption from the Reg FD and the right to gather 
and use confidential information, if the issuer’s management provides misleading or 
false information, maybe even certified by its auditors and lawyers, the CRAs have 
little force to unhide that and little possibility not to rely on the information provided by 
the issuer. 
 
The various scandals induced supervisors and regulators to deal with the matter of 
which information should be disclosed by the CRAs to make their assessment more 
transparent and therefore to increase the quality of it. The SEC and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions [IOSCO 2003a] called on disclosure of 
procedures, analytical methodologies, underlying assumptions and used criteria, so 
that an interested outside party is able to understand how the CRA derived the rating. 
This call for transparency in the rating process guided the IOSCO [2003b] as follows: 
First, the meaning of each rating category has to be disclosed. Second, the definition 
of default has to be clarified. Third, the CRA has to reveal the time horizon it used 
when making a rating decision. Fourth, the CRA has to inform about historical default 
rates of its rating categories and whether the default rates of these categories have 
changed over time. Fifth, the CRA has to state if a rating is unsolicited. Interestingly, 
the Basel II accord [BIS 2004a] contents the first four disclosure recommendations 
too.  
 
The CRAs will disclose information voluntarily for-free only as long as the marginal 
benefit exceeds the marginal cost. Frost [2006] argues that the benefits arise from a 
higher reputation and credibility. The market values the higher quality product and an 
increased disclosure includes a better chance to preempt regulatory requirements or 
oversight. Potential costs may result from the revelation of proprietary information to 
competitors and/or to investors who then no more need the CRA. Further, an 
increased disclosure makes a CRA more vulnerable to litigation. 
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6.3. Discussion of Proposals 
Indeed, scandals like Enron constitute the impetus for attention and request for 
improvement, but what are the requirements? The aim should not be to prevent 
another debacle like Enron, moreover 
“the main goal should be to neutralize the effects the regulatory regime 
and the natural, historical, and institutional forces may have had and be 
having on entry into the rating agency business and on day-to-day rating 
agency performance.”69
The market concentration poses the presumption that the prices (fees) are not that 
low, as they would be in a less concentrated and more competitive market. The 
Regulatory License Theory cites that a few CRAs profit from selling favorable 
regulatory treatment, which they obtained for free. Issuers pay for being rated to be 
able to sell their issuances to regulated investors, which constitute a huge and 
economically important stake of overall investment volume. 
 
First, the records have to be set straight. Indeed, the credit rating industry has a high 
market concentration with obvious entry barriers and altogether deviates from the 
ideal of a competitive market. I explained above that it is not possible to say whether 
the product of the principal CRAs meets a market test due to the reaction by the 
market on rating changes not necessarily stems from revealing new, valuable 
information to the market. The reaction could stem also from the increased relevance 
in contracts or from the regulatory use. Nonetheless, the credit rating industry 
includes actual and potential competition for the two market leaders. Notable 
competition constitutes Fitch and is evolving through DBRS, JCR and R&I. The for a 
short time NRSRO-designation of the later two agencies illustrates that the SEC 
reacted on the in recent years continuously made request by several scholars to 
extend the list of designated CRAs. Anyhow, there is space for improvement. A less 
concentrated market implies lower prices and higher quality.  Potential entries profit 
from fewer barriers. 
 
Regulators are part of the problem, and therefore, should be part of the solution. As 
the recent designation of JCR and R&I shows, it is the regulators role to reduce 
 
69 Cp. Hill [2004] p. 85 
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regulatory-caused entry barriers. An immediate elimination of the regulatory barrier 
on entry, as claimed by some scholars (for instance Partnoy and White), might initiate 
the contrary effect and strengthen the already dominant market players. Interestingly, 
Moody’s supports the cease of NRSRO-designation. By contrast, Fitch and S&P 
favor with maintaining NRSRO-designation. 70  The reinforcement of the currently 
dominating CRAs may happen due to that the market just got into the habit of using 
those two big players (two-rating norm) and no market participant in the position to 
deviate from this institutional norm has a motive to do that. As mentioned above, both 
sides, the one who purchases the ratings and the other one who invests in rated 
instruments, have no reason to deviate from the “tried and true”. The manager buying 
the rating of Moody’s or S&P has not to bear the costs directly from her own pocket 
and faces the risk of being punished for deviating from the “standard”-CRAs.  
 
Hill [2004] proposes to retain on the short to moderate term the NRSRO-designation 
paired with continuously increasing the number of NRSROs. On the moderate to long 
term should be revisited the proposal of eliminating the NRSRO-designation. The 
point of time for doing that depends on how long new agencies (and the already 
designated ones) need to build up enough reputation and to win over some 
geographic or business-sector niches.  
Regulators should force competition and less market concentration also by 
designating special-purpose agencies. Indeed, general purpose NRSROs were 
supported by economies of scale and scope, but for smaller agencies it is obviously 
easier to carve out business niches than to compete for the whole industry. Fitch’s 
success in structured finance supports that argument. Although Fitch’s weak position 
in general purpose, it successfully established itself in this market niche and is quite 
able to compete with the big two other players. This fact is consistent with the 
Reputational Capital Theory, in terms of, in a new sector all players have to build up 
new reputation. Furthermore, it conforms to the “sticky” market behavior patterns, for 
instance, the two-rating norm. Such patterns have not been established and 
therefore constituted no hurdle for Fitch to gain ground. Globalization may constitute 
 
70 S&P argues that “any effort to withdraw all regulatory uses of NRSRO credit ratings on a wholesale 
basis could prove to be disruptive to the U.S. securities markets.” Cp. S&P Letter from l. C. O’Neil 
[2003] p. 6. See for the statement of Moody’s the Letter from R. W. McDaniel [2003] and Fitch the 
Letter from C. D. Brown [2003]. These letters were sent to J. G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, in response to 
the request for comments of the SEC to the concept release “Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit 
Ratings under the Federal Securities Laws”. 
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a helpful driver in this issue. Hill [2004] argues that up-growing agencies may find 
prospects in markets wherein the two-rating norm has not (jet) established. First, the 
selection of CRAs is not from the beginning clearly defined in these markets. Second, 
it is not assured that the norm establishes in those, and moreover, the opposite might 
be possible. When present markets become familiar with markets wherein such a 
norm is not common, it may erode. Certainly, limited designation – geographically or 
for certain business sectors – runs the risk to brand such agencies second class, 
hampering them even more to gain ground in the business and build up reputation. 
But, the potential reduction in market concentration seems to outweigh that risk. 
Besides, this risk could be contained by regulators, for instance, with credent stating 
the all CRAs designated for that purpose are all equal and qualified. 
 
Furthermore, the – at least in the short to moderate term – maintenance in 
NRSRO-designation should be paired with a criteria-change, periodically proposed 
by White. White requests a stronger output-focused configuration of the 
NRSRO-criteria proposed by the SEC. Besides the “catch-22” conflict to fulfill the 
admission criteria, it is an incontrovertible fact that the proposed criteria by the SEC 
largely focus on inputs rather than on outputs. Changing that facilitates entry through 
innovation. Better methods, technologies or institutions for predicting creditworthiness 
may induce a less concentrated market structure. Additionally, there is no ongoing 
evaluation whether the criteria are still fulfilled. In other words, once you are 
designated, you keep always designated. It is the regulators’ job to reorganize the 
admission criteria under consideration of not to strengthen already established 
agencies. 
 
Nonetheless, even if all these proposals were implemented, challenging the market 
position of Moody’s or S&P will be quite difficult. Establishing as a small-niche-CRA 
might be easy, but competing on the whole industry will be left pretty difficult. In 
theory, argues Hill [2004], has a new entrant three possibilities to gain market share: 
to compete on price; to have low standards (or ease of dealing with the 
customers/issuers); or to specialize in a business niche. Unfortunately drop out the 
former two. Worth noting, Fitch has reportable tried to compete with all three 
possibilities and succeeded constricted therewith. Regarding competition on 
standards, the failure is quite obvious. If the agency has low standards, it constitutes 
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the contrary, what the market is looking for: an accurate and credible predictor for 
default probabilities. Hence, reputational capital will not be built up. By contrast, if the 
agency has higher standards than Moody’s and S&P, this neither will be rewarded 
with success, due to the compensation system used in the credit rating industry (at 
least by the global acting big players, with a regulatory secured demand). 
Competition on lower prices, compared to Moody’s and S&P, neither opens a road to 
success. Financial better terms for instruments rated by Moody’s and S&P and the 
threat of being second-guessed for this decision seem to outbalance the higher 
prices of the big two agencies. The incentive structure in the market preventing to 
abandon the two-rating norm is discussed at length above. Issuers and in particular 
their CEOs are better rewarded for successful offerings than for economizing costs of 
offerings.  
 
Worth noting, two commentators suggested an evaluation and monitoring process in 
SEC Hearings [2002] analogous to the process used for renewing Broadcast 
licenses.71 The process should serve as basis for a comparable process of renewing 
NRSRO-designation. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) grants or 
renews broadcast licenses periodically for several years. The FCC solicits public 
comment on the performance of the licensee and whether the license should be 
renewed. The motivation behind is to stimulate competition in the industry. The main 
question is whether the threat of non-renewal is credible, especially for Moody’s and 
S&P. If the threat holds indeed for new and small agencies but not for established 
agencies, it would strengthen solely those and takes competition out of the market. It 
seems that this question can be denied in general. The FCC has never dismissed a 
renewal of permanent Broadcast license.72 Furthermore, pressures by the market 
against non-renewals (in particular for Moody’s and S&P) seem very likely. If such a 
renewal is threatened to be dismissed are going to be the market reactions in all 
probability quite strong. Accordingly, the reluctance not to renew would be quite 
considerable. Regardless whether the pressure of non-renewal is the output of public 
 
71 See SEC [2002]. The two commentators are Amy Lancellota, Senior Council of the Investment 
Company Institute, and Cynthia Strauss, Director of Taxable Bond Research, Fidelity Investments 
Money Management. 
72 The great majority of Broadcast licenses are granted by the FCC. Solely one non-renewal of a 
temporary license took place. See Hill [2004] concerning the implementation in the credit rating 
industry and see Yoo [2003] concerning Broadcast licences. 
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hearings, they could be still valuable, due to constituting the threat to be shamed. 
The fear of negative publicity, in the form of one agency is criticized on its output and 
compared to the others, can be indeed valuable. This fear makes agencies being 
afraid of loosing reputation and might stimulate competition.  
 
The litigation in the U.S., is discussed at length above. A proposed change might be 
an overruling of the decision in the Quinn-case or an elimination of the Rule 436(g) – 
both exempt NRSROs from litigation. When doing an improvement should be kept in 
mind that, especially in the U.S. where “suing all” is practiced, it becomes not 
possible and common that “after a downgrade, it is sued.” Indeed, fraudulence is a 
different matter which clearly should be actionable. But, there is no evidence for fraud 
and CRAs’ ratings are no security against change and economical dynamics. As 
initially desired, the goal is to reduce the market concentration and entry barriers. The 
litigation-issue seems not to be appropriate for connecting that goal with an 
improvement in rating agencies performance. The improvement in performance is 
better reached with opening the market and therefore achieving less concentration 
paired with any kind of ongoing evaluation of output. 
 
The European regulatory solution is relatively young compared to the U.S. regime. 
Although it is visible that the European supervisors orientated on the U.S. solution, 
they have learned to some extent from the “failures” in the U.S. regulatory regime. 
The Basel II accord uses CRAs less direct. Even though the accord relies on credit 
ratings for net capital determination, it offers alternative mechanisms (IRB-approach) 
for doing that without incorporating credit ratings. Indeed, this argument seems to be 
weak at first glance, considering that, the ratings are paid by the issuers (accordingly 
receive the banks them for free) and installing such an internal rating process 
(needed for IRB-approach) constitutes huge costs for the bank. Nevertheless, hereby 
the same model of comparing the net value holds as it does for buy-side and sell-side 
firms. Those nevertheless do their own evaluation of credit risk for both risk 
management and trading purposes. In addition includes Basel II an ongoing 
oversight of the once recognized ECAIs. 
 
Another interesting proposal is the replacement of the NRSRO-designation by a 
market-based measure. Credit spreads, CDSs or Equity prices had been cited as 
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more suitable measures for credit risk. Especially Partnoy is a strong supporter for 
NRSRO-replacement with market-based measures. Breger, Goldberg and Cheyette 
[2003] describe a model for market implied ratings and deal with the problem where 
to set the threshold from one rating class to the next based on credit spreads. They 
investigated significance for US-dollar and Euro-denoted bonds. Furthermore, they 
highlight that in the rating debacles, Enron, Xerox and Koninklikje (Dutch telecom 
company), their model would have better described the rating of that securities and 
would have earlier downgraded them.  
The motivation behind is to use more market information. White [2006] highlights: To 
rely on market information, where the “market” is a well-defined but impersonal 
mechanism is one thing. But, credit ratings do not have the impersonality like, for 
instance, the market prices of treasury bills. Partnoy states:  
“The great advantage to a market-based measure is that it incorporates all 
available information into a rating, including the ratings of other credit 
rating agencies.”73
Partnoy, supporting NRSRO-replacement by market-based measures, tries to rebut 
three areas of criticism. First, the high and inappropriate volatility of credit spreads, 
including daily fluctuations, can be eliminated by taking the average of them into 
account. This seems plausible and gives the regulators the ability to define volatility 
in respect of the needed qualities, discussed above, regarding stability, timeliness 
and the spiral effect. Regarding the spiral effect, a more volatile measure might 
prevent the selling pressures activated by ad-hoc downgrades by rating agencies. 
However, a higher volatility might make ratings unsuitable for contractual use. 
Furthermore, a company near the threshold investment/non-investment grade 
measured by a volatile instrument would be hard to manage if it qualifies one month 
for regulated investors and the next month not. Second, he rebuts the critic that credit 
spreads are backward looking with the argument that credit ratings are even more 
backward looking.74 And third, market-based measures are criticized to be limited for 
liquid securities. In my view, Partnoy understates that problem by proposing to use 
 
73 See Partnoy [2006] p. 91. 
74 Partnoy refers to the statement of Frank Fernandez: “Spreads are the reflection of the last trade in 
the marketplace, and that market may be wrong on any given day about the long-term fundamental 
value, the probability of default or ultimate recovery value of any security.” See SEC [2002]. Partnoy 
argues: “The markets for bonds as well as the markets for CDSs and equities incorporate information 
about future expectations. To the extent that any measure is likely to be forward looking, it is a market 
measure, not an NRSRO rating.” See Partnoy [2006] p. 93. 
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such a measure at the beginning solely for liquid securities and arguing that with the 
development of the CDS market arise market measures for illiquid bonds. 
Well, the criticism regarding liquidity is much more far-reaching then market liquidity, 
and the problem of market price building for illiquid securities. The reason is the 
vice-versa argumentation done above in chapter 5.2.2. The point is, credit spreads 
incorporate indeed a premium for credit risk, but also a premium for market liquidity. 
Accordingly, credit spreads are inappropriate for determining credit risk. What should 
rating agencies do – from a regulatory perspective? They are a tool in the 
“safety-and-soundness” regulation to ensure, that institutional investors do not invest 
in “risky” securities, to prevent consequences of the defaults of them. When the 
securities default, the institutional investors default and that would disturb the 
markets and harm the population. Well, the tool – deciding on investment or 
non-investment grade – defines whether a huge stake of potential capital is allowed 
do invest or to maintain holding. This represents financing and liquidity for the 
underlying company. A market-based measure, like credit spreads, reflects and is 
driven by that issue. Therefore, a measure affected by the underlying’s liquidity is 
inappropriate to define the underlying’s liquidity. 
 
 
In sum, it has to be stated clearly, whatever improvement is going to be done, without 
increasing competition in the industry even the best solution will “just” improve the 
quality of rating agencies’ output. To achieve a decline in price will be by far more 
sophisticated and by all means needs a less concentrated industry. 
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7. Conclusion 
The U.S. has a very long history in using credit rating agencies (CRAs) as an 
external tool in their “safety-and-soundness” regulation of the fixed income market. 
However, other countries around the world tied up. Especially, the Basel II directive 
and its conversion in European countries strengthened the credit rating industry on a 
global scale. The regulatory use and regime regarding CRAs has been reviewed by 
reason of scandals like Enron. The Enron debacle itself may not justify a regulatory 
improvement, but there is no reason not to use that adventitious evoked attention for 
making a workable system better. For taking full advantage of this opportunity, 
supervisors should revisit the regime. What are the forces limiting competition and 
how can they be weakened?  
 
Nowadays is the Credit Rating Industry’s product relevant in three different aspects. 
In the early stages of the industry constituted the credit ratings “merely” an 
informational value. CRAs helped solving the asymmetrical information problem 
between investors and issuers. In the last century developed two further tasks which 
principal CRAs undertake.  
The first additional task stems from transactional relevance. This relevance arises 
from the contractual use in form of contingency clauses and from the large-scale 
integration in structured finance transactions. Although credit ratings are “solely” the 
CRA’s “opinion”, as contingency clauses they create legal rights and are used as if 
they constitute an objective measure for creditworthiness. In structured finance 
transactions are CRAs directly involved and a conflict of interest arises. The CRA 
certifies and guarantees the validity of the transaction and as a result acts more like 
an external auditor. This role is more difficult to replace compared to its role as 
information gatherer. In the “traditional business” of CRAs make buy-side and 
sell-side firms there own analysis and assessment of credit risk.  
The second additional task is the regulatory use. This relevance evolves from the 
delegation of power and competence outwards to determine whether securities fulfill 
the minimum quality standards and therefore, if large and economical important 
investors are allowed to hold those securities. The quality is measured by CRAs and 
they state “investment” or “non-investment”. This involves those regulated investors 
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to pay direct attention on credit ratings. Owing to liquidity needs also issuers have to 
pay indirect attention on credit ratings.  
 
The credit rating industry is dominated by Moody’s and S&P, having a market share 
of 80% – together with Fitch they have 95%. There has established a two-rating norm 
in the industry. Issuers pay both Moody’s and S&P for being rated by them. This 
pattern of behavior persists easily due to several reasons. Is seems that all in the 
position to deviate from that pattern of behavior are comfortable with it. Solely new or 
small agencies are hurt. There is no competition between the market leaders in the 
traditional information gathering business. Small CRAs have solely one effective 
possibility to compete: to specialize in a (new) business niche. Fitch proved that in 
the structured finance sector and got the second used CRA with Moody’s. In such 
new sectors is the two-rating norm not established and all CRAs have to build up new 
reputational capital. For regulatory purposes are used solely the huge CRAs. The 
rational behind might be the “whose-rating” problem – to prevent that a small, bogus 
CRA issues a “AAA” rating for a certain amount of money. Both the transactional and 
the regulatory use of ratings build up on the informational value. Accordingly has the 
later to be fulfilled first. An informational valuable output can be expected from small, 
profitable CRAs, which are not regulatory used and are charging investors. 
Accordingly should those be recognized by the regulators. 
 
Natural reasons like economies of scale, standardization in ratings and an aggressive 
merger policy by Fitch reduced the number of market participants. The development 
of the bond capital market explains the stronger demand for ratings in the U.S. and 
why the regulatory use of few CRAs in the U.S. regulatory regime had that grave 
consequences on the whole industry. The under-development in coverage of credit 
ratings in Europe might be explained by the greater reliance on bank intermediation. 
The designation criteria for regulatory purposes are an enormous entry barrier. They 
focus on input instead of on output and include a “catch-22” conflict. The regulatory 
regime created a demand for ratings and restricted the supply on solely a few CRAs. 
Until 2003 were only Moody’s, S&P and Fitch NRSRO-recognized. 
 
The increased relevance of ratings evoked several conflicts of interest and other 
problems. Those strengthen the market position of solely a few CRAs. The direct 
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dependence by investors and the indirect dependence by issuers on ratings through 
the regulatory use allows the regulatory-used CRAs to charge the issuers instead of 
the investors. The conflict of being paid by the party which is evaluated seems from 
an economical perspective very low. More problematic might be the use of 
unsolicited ratings to pressure on issuers to pay for being rated. Interestingly, while 
financial regulators rely on the credibility of the CRAs’ opinion the court is saying that 
such a reliance by an investor is unreasonable.  
The transactional and regulatory use of ratings makes it difficult to say whether the 
market reacts on rating changes because they are new, valuable information. 
Investors may react due to the regulatory-caused liquidity constraint. Contingency 
clauses provoke a spiral-effect after downgrades. In sum, it is not necessary that 
ratings of the principal CRAs provide new information, they are information due to 
their nowadays expanded use and increased relevance. Furthermore, even if the 
rating downgrade is unjustified, there is a some kind of self-fulfilling process due to 
the spiral effect. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the principal CRAs do more 
than solely selling favorable regulatory treatment and that they provide accurate 
information. Accordingly should be considered how regulators could ease the current 
market concentration and make a workable system better.  
 
A less concentrated market would lower the prices and increases the quality. 
Regulators should expand the list of CRAs used for regulatory purposes by those 
CRAs that have proved for several years their informational valuable output. Also 
special-purpose CRAs should complement the list of regulatory-used CRAs to 
increases the competition in the industry. Additionally should be the criteria for CRAs 
for regulatory use less focused on input than on output and an ongoing oversight of 
the recognized CRAs has to be done by the regulators. The immediate cease of 
NRSRO-designation would strengthen the current market leaders due to the 
institutional context wherein the change would take place. Market-based measures 
like credit spreads are no appropriate alternative. Every improvement in regulation on 
short or long-run has to take into account that both Moody’s and S&P became heavily 
entrenched. It is the regulators’ job to help to deal with these natural, historical and 
institutional forces being responsible for the high market concentration and as far as 
possible to weaken them, even if it will take a longer time period until the two-rating 
norm – usage of Moody’s and S&P – will disappear. 
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VI. Summary in German 
Die Kreditratingbranche (KRB) wird von zwei Kreditratingagenturen (KRA) dominiert, 
Moody’s und Standard&Poors (S&P). Sie haben einen Marktanteil von ungefähr 80% 
und zusammen mit Fitch vereinen sie in etwa 95%. Obwohl das Scheitern in einer 
zuverlässigen Kreditrisikoabschätzung in Skandalen, wie z.B. Enron, von den KRA 
noch nicht Grund genug für eine Verbesserung der Regulierungssysteme ist, kann 
die dadurch entstandene Aufmerksamkeit genutzt werden, um ein funktionsfähiges 
System zu verbessern. Hierfür muss ergründet werden, welche Faktoren die Markt-
struktur derart konzentriert haben und ob bzw. wie diese Einflussfaktoren ge-
schwächt werden können. 
Heutzutage ist das Produkt von KRA in dreierlei Hinsicht relevant: Bereits in den 
Anfängen der KRB hatten Kreditratings einen Informationswert und halfen bei der 
Entschärfung der Informationsasymmetrien zwischen Emittenten und Investoren. Die 
Transaktionsrelevanz entsteht durch die Verwendung von Eventualitätsklauseln und 
durch die erweiterte Integration in strukturierten Finanztransaktionen. Obwohl 
Kreditratings „lediglich“ die Meinung von KRA sind, schaffen sie Recht und werden 
verwendet, als seien sie ein objektives Messinstrument für Kreditrisiko. Bei 
strukturierten Finanztransaktionen hilft und verkauft die KRA die Strukturierung so zu 
gestallten, dass sie sehr hoch bewertet wird. Die KRA tritt mehr als ein externer 
Auditor auf, womit sie nicht so leicht ersetzt werden kann, wie im 
„traditionellen“ Geschäft der Kreditrisikoevaluierung. Außerdem werden Kreditratings 
zu Regulierungszwecken eingesetzt. Die Relevanz entsteht durch die Übertragung 
von Macht und Kompetenz an KRA zur Bestimmung ob Finanzinstrumente die 
Mindestanforderungen erfüllen und von wirtschaftlich wichtigen institutionellen 
Investoren gehalten werden dürfen.  
Es hat sich eine zwei-Ratingnorm etabliert. Die Emittenten bezahlen sowohl Moody’s 
als auch S&P um geratet zu werden. Dieses Verhaltensmuster wird durch mehrere 
Gründe leicht fortgesetzt. Niemand in der Position um davon abzuweichen besitzt ein 
Motive dies zu tun. Lediglich die kleinen bzw. neuen KRA werden benachteiligt. Zwi-
schen den Marktführern existiert kein Konkurrenzkampf im traditionellen Geschäfts-
zweig. Kleine KRA haben bloß eine effektive Möglichkeit zu konkurrieren: die 
Spezialisierung auf eine Marktnische. Fitch bewies dies im strukturierten Finanztrans-
aktionsbereich. In solchen neuen Märkten existiert keine zwei-Ratingnorm und alle 
KRA müssen sich erst eine Reputation aufbauen. Zu Regulierungszwecken werden 
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nur die großen KRA genutzt. Gründ hierfür mag die sog. „whose-rating“-Problematik 
sein: Es ist zu verhindern, dass eine Schein-KRA einem Emittenten „AAA“ beurteilt. 
Sowohl der Transaktions- als auch der Regulierungsgebrauch bauen auf dem 
Informationswert auf, womit dieser primär erfüllt werden muss. Von einem wertvollen 
Informationsoutput ist bei kleinen, profitablen KRA auszugehen, welche nicht regula-
tiv genutzt werden und welche von Investoren anstatt von Emittenten bezahlt werden. 
Diese sind daher in die Liste der regulative genutzten KRA aufzunehmen. 
Natürliche Gründe wie „economies of scale“, Standardisierung im Rating und eine 
aggressive Mergerpolitik von Fitch reduzierten die Anzahl der Marktteilnehmer. Die 
Entwicklung des Fremdkapitalmarktes erklärt die stärkere Nachfrage nach Ratings in 
den USA und warum die Verwendung lediglich weniger KRA zu Regulierungs-
zwecken in den USA solch gravierende Auswirkungen auf die gesamte Branche 
hatte. Die Aufnahmekriterien für KRA zu Regulierungszwecken stellen eine große 
Eintrittsbarriere dar. Sie sind Input- anstatt Output-orientiert und beinhalten ein 
„catch-22“-Dilemma. Das Regulierungssystem kreierte eine Nachfrage und limitierte 
das Angebot auf lediglich wenige KRA. Bis 2003 waren nur Moody’s, S&P und Fitch 
zugelassen. 
Die erhöhte Relevanz von Ratings brachte diverse Interessenskonflikte und andere 
Probleme hervor. Die großen KRA werden von den Emittenten bezahlt, die sie 
beurteilen. Dies ist möglich durch die direkte Abhängigkeit der Investoren und durch 
die indirekte Abhängigkeit der Emittenten durch den regulativen Gebrauch. KRA nut-
zen möglicherweise etwas schlechtere, unaufgeforderte („unsolicited”) Ratings um 
Druck auf die Emittenten auf Bezahlung auszuüben.  
Ein weniger konzentrierter Markt würde niedrigere Preise und eine höhere Qualität 
hervorbringen. Die Regulierungsorgane sollten die Liste der genutzten KRA um jene 
erweitern, welche einige Zeit einen wertvollen Informationsoutput bewiesen haben. 
Die Ernennung zu Spezialzwecken von kleinen KRA sollte diese Liste ergänzen um 
den Konkurrenzkampf zu erhöhen. Zusätzlich sollten die Aufnahmekriterien weniger 
Input- und mehr Output-orientiert sein. Eine kontinuierliche Überprüfung der 
registrierten KRA sollte ebenfalls durchgeführt werden. Die unmittelbare Auflösung 
der Ernennung durch die Regulatoren würde die derzeitigen Marktführer stärken. 
Marktbasierte Messinstrumente wie „credit spreads“ eignen sich nicht zur 
Regulierung. Jegliche Veränderung hat die starke Verankerung der Marktführer mit 
ins Kalkül zu ziehen. 
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